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PHYSICIANS’ ELUSIVE PUBLIC HEALTH DUTIES *
RICHARD S. SAVER **
Law, consistent with bioethics and medical norms, directs physicians to “put
patients first.” To what extent do physicians have broader responsibilities for
community health, beyond and even counter to those owed to their patients?
More salient in the era of COVID-19, the question of physicians’ obligations to
safeguard the health of non-patients continually vexes courts, policy makers, and
scholars.
This Article reveals how physicians’ public health duties are confoundingly
elusive. Elusive in the sense that while at times affirming physicians’ special
capacity and obligations to improve the health of the community, law more often
obscures physicians’ public health duties with limited, ad hoc recognition and
insufficient theorization. These public health duties are also elusive in actual
application. Physicians can point to individual patient obligations as reasons to
evade compliance with certain public health laws or to discount public health
considerations in clinical decision-making.
Putting patients first also masks less patient-centered justifications for physician
disengagement with public health, including financial considerations and
professional authority concerns. The strong patient-primacy directive has
underappreciated costs. It frequently overrides physicians’ more elusive public
health duties in ways that facilitate externalization of health risks to the general
public. This Article analyzes the COVID-19 pandemic, antibiotic resistance,
infectious disease reporting, the opioid crisis, and gun violence as disturbing
examples. It further identifies important justifications, including, most
importantly, role indispensability for amplifying physicians’ public health
responsibilities. While difficult doctrinal and pragmatic challenges arise in
recalibrating physicians’ duties, requiring community physicians to pay greater
heed to the population’s health seems unavoidably necessary.
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INTRODUCTION
As the coronavirus 2019 (“COVID-19”) crisis worsened in March of 2020,
some physicians continued to perform elective procedures like spinal
decompression and “Tommy John” surgery, creating opportunities for virus
transmission and potentially exacerbating shortages of oxygen, personal
protective equipment, personnel, and other critical resources needed for
fighting the pandemic. 1 These actions contradicted public health
recommendations from influential authorities, including the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), the American College of Surgeons
(“ACS”), and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”). 2 It
may seem counterintuitive that physicians would disregard public health to this
degree. Yet, these physicians cannot simply be dismissed as outliers. A common
justification was that the physicians had duties to their patients. Indeed, these
physicians could credibly say that law, bioethics, and professional norms
supported their conduct.
Surely physicians have obligations to protect the health of the community?
Improving public health seems socially desirable, right within doctors’
wheelhouse, and an implicit condition of their professional licensure. 3 But the
question of physicians’ responsibilities for the health of non-patients, more
salient in the era of COVID-19, continually vexes courts, policy makers, and
scholars. Actions to protect public health are in constant tension with
1. Mackenzie Bean, Laura Miller & Anuja Vaidya, These Hospitals and Physicians Aren’t Stopping
Elective Surgery: Here’s Their Thinking, BECKER’S HOSP. REV., https://www.beckershospitalre
view.com/patient-flow/these-hospitals-and-physicians-aren-t-stopping-elective-surgeries-here-s-theirthinking.html [https://perma.cc/Z5MR-LZF9] (Mar. 19, 2020, 4:15 PM); Jordan McPherson, An MLB
Pitcher Is Able To Get Tommy John Surgery in Florida During COVID-19 Outbreak. Why?, MIA. HERALD
(Mar. 25, 2020, 11:21 AM), https://www.miamiherald.com/sports/mlb/article241482786.html
[https://perma.cc/23AW-RLV9]. “Tommy John” surgery, or ulnar collateral ligament reconstruction,
repairs a torn ligament that helps secure the elbow joint. Athletes who play throwing sports often have
this surgery. Tommy John Surgery (Ulnar Collateral Ligament Reconstruction), JOHNS HOPKINS MED.,
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/treatment-tests-and-therapies/tommy-john-surgery-ulnarcollateral-ligament-reconstruction [https://perma.cc/HAQ5-J938]. It is associated with baseball pitcher
Tommy John, the first athlete to successfully return to baseball pitching after the procedure. Id.
2. Bean et al., supra note 1; CMS Releases Recommendations on Adult Elective Surgeries, NonEssential Medical, Surgical, and Dental Procedures During Covid-19 Response, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/cms-releases-recommendations-adult-elective-surgeries-non-essential-medical-surgical-anddental [https://perma.cc/696H-8DFG]. The CDC initially recommended that health care providers
reschedule elective procedures. See Interim Guidance for Healthcare Facilities: Preparing for Community
Transmission of COVID-19 in the United States, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb.
29, 2020), https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/85502 [https://perma.cc/Z84S-PDHR]. For the recent
CDC guidance about managing health care facility operations, see Healthcare Facilities: Managing
Operations During the COVID-19 Pandemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/guidance-hcf.html [https://perma.cc/
4CGB-FMZQ] (last updated Mar. 17, 2021).
3. See infra Section I.C.
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physicians’ duties to their individual patients. Law, bioethics, and medical
norms typically consider physicians’ duties to individual patients supreme,
reflected in the ubiquitous health care mantra of “putting patients first.” 4
Meanwhile, physicians’ responsibilities for the health of the community, while
technically acknowledged, frequently end up muddled or neglected.
Conventional wisdom holds that law and policy should ensure that
physicians attend to the individual patient’s needs, preferences, and values. This
push for a more “patient-centered” health care system dominates much legal
and medical scholarship as well as reports from expert advisory bodies. 5 Putting
patients front and center has considerable appeal for many reasons, including
promoting patient trust, deterring physicians from conflicting interests, and
shielding the intimate healing process between doctor and patient from outside
interference. However, as some commentators have observed, this bias in favor
of relationships with existing patients also frustrates serving the broader public
interest. 6 Addressing matters of collective importance, such as health care cost
control, often requires standardized, regulatory approaches and looking beyond
relational obligations to patients.
This Article further cautions about always putting patients first and
challenges the generally accepted dominance of patient-centered duties. It is
the first to comprehensively analyze how patient primacy paradoxically crowds
out needed attention to the critical public health space. It highlights the
underappreciated costs of privileging the individual patient by considering the
health vulnerabilities of the populace. Physicians can all too easily discount
community health considerations because their public health duties under law
are confoundingly elusive, both in theory and in application. Elusive in the
sense that while law at times affirms physicians’ special capacity and obligations
to improve the health of the community, it more often obscures physicians’
4. See, e.g., Coombes v. Florio, 877 N.E.2d 567, 577 (Mass. 2007) (“To a physician, it is the
patient . . . who must always come first.”); David Orentlicher, The Physician’s Duty To Treat During
Pandemics, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1459, 1459 (2018) (“Physicians assume a primary ethical duty to
place the welfare of their patients first, above their own interests.”); see also Thomas R. Viggiano,
Wojciech Pawlina, Keith D. Lindor, Kerry D. Olsen & Denis A. Cortese, Putting the Needs of the Patient
First: Mayo Clinic’s Core Value, Institutional Culture, and Professionalism Covenant, 82 ACAD. MED. 1089,
1089 (2007) (articulating the “guiding principle of the practice: ‘the needs of the patient come first’”
(citing William J. Mayo, The Necessity of Cooperation in Medicine, 75 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 553, 556
(2000))).
5. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY 39–40 (Rona Briere ed., 2001); Ronald M. Epstein, Kevin Fiscella, Cara S. Lesser
& Kurt C. Strange, Why the Nation Needs a Policy Push on Patient-Centered Health Care, 29 HEALTH
AFFS. 1489, 1489 (2010); Maxwell J. Mehlman, Dishonest Medical Mistakes, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1137,
1144–53 (2006).
6. See, e.g., William M. Sage, Relational Duties, Regulatory Duties, and the Widening Gap Between
Individual Health Law and Collective Health Policy, 96 GEO. L.J. 497, 500 (2008) (“[F]ar more legal
issues in health care are approached as relational than as regulatory problems, making it very difficult
for law to serve truly ‘public’ policy.”).
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public health duties with limited, ad hoc recognition and insufficient
theorization for the source and strength of such duties. These public health
duties are also elusive in their actual operation. Because their public health
responsibilities are viewed as inevitably inferior to their duties to individual
patients, physicians have considerable discretion to evade public health laws or
disregard public health implications of their treatment decisions. Thus, public
health duties may theoretically exist, but it is debatable whether they
pragmatically matter much when they hold such marginal sway over physician
decision-making.
A significant divide exists between medicine and public health. A
physician provides specifically tailored treatment within the confines of a
special doctor-patient relationship. In contrast, public health embraces a
population perspective, seeking to understand the root causes of illness in the
community and identify conditions for wellness and health promotion for the
populace. 7 The practice of public health typically involves epidemiological
analysis and disease control measures. 8 Public health also focuses more on
prevention whereas medicine principally aims to cure existing illness. 9
Moreover, public health services are usually associated with public health
agencies, safety-net providers, and governmental health care programs—not
regular clinicians. 10 A perhaps necessary tension exists between medicine and
public health as there are “inevitable tradeoffs that arise in trying to optimize
health at both levels.” 11
The elusivity of physicians’ responsibilities to public health arises in part
because law, reinforced by bioethics and medical norms, clings to the
medicine/public health divide and envisions physicians’ duties as almost
exclusively arising through formation of treatment relationships with individual
patients. In favoring physicians’ connections to individual patients, U.S. law
enforces an atomistic version of health care that matches American society’s
traditionally strong embrace of individualism and liberty. Yet, as the COVID19 pandemic has shown, this also makes for a lousy public health response
because of the “refusal . . . to think in terms of the social whole — of what’s best

7. LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN & LINDSAY WILEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY,
RESTRAINT 12 (3d ed. 2016).
8. What Is Public Health?, AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, https://apha.org/what-is-public-health
[https://perma.cc/T2KQ-RRCN].
9. Id.
10. See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 16–18 (2d
ed. 2008).
11. Arnold J. Rosoff, Policy Challenges in Modern Health Care, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 523, 525 (2005);
see also Bruce A. Barron, Conflicts Between Public Health and Medical Care, HUFFPOST,
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/health-care-costs_b_3037450 [https://perma.cc/M3DL-AF48] (June
16, 2013).
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for the community.” 12 Heightened emphasis on physicians as agents of
individual health detracts from the common good by glossing over the
interconnectedness of health care system stakeholders. As this Article explores,
it is not so easy to cabin individualized medical considerations from public
health. For example, a physician’s failure to counsel a patient with infectious
disease about transmission risk may expose community members to the
contagion. Physicians’ general disengagement with public health exacerbates
the larger silo problem confronting the nation’s public health system—public
health care remains underfunded, undervalued, and viewed as distinctly apart
from an already fragmented health care delivery system. 13
Against this backdrop of elusivity and concerning threats to public health,
this Article makes several important contributions. First, it addresses current
confusion about the extent of physicians’ responsibilities for community health
under current legal standards. It canvasses existing law to identify and critically
evaluate the multiple sources of authority for physicians’ public health duties,
their precise scope, their significance, and the discrete contexts in which they
arise. Second, it analyzes how bioethics and medical norms reinforce the
indeterminate yet ultimately inferior status of physicians’ public health duties
under law. Third, it reveals how the strong patient-primacy directive frequently
overrides physicians’ more elusive public health duties in ways that facilitate
externalization of health risks to the general public. Moreover, it exposes how
the broad patient-primacy directive can mask less patient-centered
justifications, including financial considerations 14 and professional authority
concerns, 15 for physician disengagement with public health. Fourth, this Article
argues that it is high time to bring not only greater clarity but greater weight to
physicians’ public health obligations under law. It evaluates possible objections
and also identifies important justifications, as a matter of legal theory, policy,
and ultimately pragmatic need, that support such a recalibration of physicians’
duties.
Some immediate qualifications are necessary. This Article considers the
duties and obligations of “private” physicians treating patients in the course of
ordinary care. It is these physicians in the clinical trenches for whom the public
health-duties question is particularly elusive. In contrast, a smaller number of
“public” physicians work in governmental agencies and wear official hats as
health officers of the state. These public physicians, not the subject of this
12. Damon Linker, Coronavirus Is Revealing a Shattered Country, THE WEEK (July 1,
2020), https://theweek.com/articles/922812/coronavirus-revealing-shattered-country [https://perma
.cc/W4LR-GXET].
13. Eileen Salinsky & Elin A. Gursky, The Case for Transforming Governmental Public Health, 25
HEALTH AFFS. 1017, 1017–19 (2006).
14. See infra Section III.A (discussing elective procedures during COVID-19).
15. See infra Section III.D (discussing opioid prescribing and prescription drug monitoring).
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Article, can be more easily and readily understood to have obligations to work
for community health, by virtue of their official positions and the enabling
statutory and regulatory directives for their respective agencies. 16
Another qualification concerns the interaction of medical and public
health duties. If the medicine/public health divide presents a false dichotomy,
then individual health and public health need not always be in tension.
Frequently, a physician who works to improve the health of her individual
patients also helps to better community health. For example, a physician who
zealously ensures that her patient promptly completes a treatment regimen for
a sexually transmitted disease ends up protecting the patient but also public
health by reducing the risk of transmission to sexual partners in the community.
In many instances “putting patients first” aligns with public health. However,
it is too deceptively simple to say that physicians who fulfill duties to individual
patients also protect the health of the community. While the dual purposes need
not always be in tension, divergence at times remains inevitable. It is these
difficult, contestable situations of misalignment, and the impact of the
elusiveness of private physicians’ public health duties, that form the focus of
this Article.
Part I describes the legal background, mapping out the limited instances
where law imposes duties on community physicians to protect the public health,
the common law and statutory sources of authority for these obligations, their
imprecise scope, the contexts in which they arise, and how such duties remain
secondary to physicians’ individual patient obligations. Part II analyzes how
bioethics and medical norms amplify law’s patient-primacy directive and
seemingly obscure and enfeeble physicians’ public health obligations. Part III
reveals how the elusiveness of physicians’ public health duties presents insidious
problems by enabling externalization of health risks from patients to the
population at large. Part III then discusses examples across the wide public
health space including the COVID-19 pandemic, antibiotic resistance,
infectious disease reporting, opioid prescribing, and gun violence. Part IV
acknowledges the difficult challenges, both doctrinal and pragmatic, in making
community physicians’ public health duties more cognizable and influential. It
also identifies various justifications for this shift. The most important reason is
instrumental: physicians’ role indispensability. The private physician is
strategically embedded between her patient, other patients, and society and
performs critical sentinel, gatekeeper, and learned intermediary functions
16. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-45.5 (LEXIS through S.L. 2021-4 of the 2021 Reg. Sess.
of the Gen. Assemb.) (providing duties of a public health authority director to include investigating
causes of communicable disease and disseminating public health information); TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 121.024 (Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. of the 86th Leg.) (providing duties
of a state health officer, or “health authority,” to include establishing quarantines and aiding the public
health department in “disease prevention and suppression”).
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essential to an effective public health system. These rationales may not fully
address the legitimate concerns with recalibration of physicians’ public health
duties. But, as this Article concludes, requiring private physicians to pay greater
heed to the population’s health seems unavoidably necessary.
I. LIMITED LEGAL DUTIES TO PROTECT PUBLIC HEALTH
Physicians’ public health duties arise from a confusing patchwork of
overlapping sources of authority, including common law governing the doctorpatient relationship and statutory and regulatory requirements. At times, law
acknowledges that private physicians play an important public health role and
imposes community health responsibilities on clinicians in isolated, discrete
contexts. Yet the obligations imposed are hardly robust and seemingly hold
marginal sway over physician decision-making. More frequently, law has
difficulty recognizing physicians’ duties beyond the relational obligations
formed with specific patients.
A.

Fiduciary Duties, Non-Patients, and Dual-Loyalty Problems

The usual starting place in understanding physicians’ duties is fiduciary
law. Numerous courts recognize the doctor-patient relationship as fiduciary in
nature because physicians, as trusted professionals with expert knowledge, may
abuse their superior position over dependent patients. 17 Perhaps the most
important duty in a fiduciary relationship, and most central to the question of
medicine/public health conflict, is the duty of loyalty. This duty obligates the
fiduciary to focus on the beneficiary’s interests and avoid conflicts where selfinterest and the interest of other parties detract from pursuit of the beneficiary’s
goals. 18
However, the reach of fiduciary law to police the doctor-patient
relationship is limited for several reasons. To start, there is considerable debate
on how broadly fiduciary doctrine even extends to the doctor-patient
relationship. Among other reasons, the doctor-patient relationship arguably
lacks certain classic fiduciary features such as the fiduciary’s control over
monetary assets. 19 In addition, fiduciary causes of action have often been
17. See, e.g., M.A. v. United States, 951 P.2d 851, 854 (Alaska 1998) (“[W]e have recognized that
the unique nature of the physician-patient relationship confers upon physicians a fiduciary
responsibility toward their patients.”); Witherell v. Weimer, 515 N.E.2d 68, 73 (Ill. 1987) (“A
physician and his patient stand in a fiduciary relation . . . .”).
18. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 2 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2003) (“Despite the
differences in the legal circumstances and responsibilities of various fiduciaries, one characteristic is
common to all: a person in a fiduciary relationship to another is under a duty to act for the benefit of
the other as to matters within the scope of the relationship.”).
19. See, e.g., Joan H. Krause, Skilling and the Pursuit of Healthcare Fraud, 66 U. MIA. L. REV. 363,
389–90 (2012) (“[T]he physician, for example, lacks the fiduciary’s traditional control over the
beneficiary-patient’s money.”).
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confusingly intermingled with more traditional claims of medical negligence
and informed consent. 20 Some leading treatises refer to the doctor-patient
relationship as a “confidential,” rather than a fiduciary, relationship. 21 Further,
while numerous U.S. court rulings affirm that the doctor-patient relationship
has fiduciary characteristics, courts in a small number of states have expressly
disagreed. 22 Other case law recognizes fiduciary duties for physicians in only
very limited circumstances, such as obligations to maintain confidentiality, but
has stopped short of applying fiduciary principles to all aspects of the doctorpatient relationship including, importantly, financial conflicts of interest. 23
Under some commentators’ views, physicians cannot be classic fiduciaries
because this would unduly interfere with their competing responsibilities to
society, including controlling health care costs. 24 Meanwhile, other scholars
insist that physicians are traditional fiduciaries and criticize the nonfiduciary
interpretation as based on misunderstanding of precedent and confusion about
the types of personal interests fiduciaries may still pursue. 25
Nonetheless, to the extent that the treating physician is a fiduciary in some
respects, certain loyalty obligations exist. As a fiduciary, the physician generally
must act for the patient’s benefit, provide individually appropriate treatment,
and avoid elevating other interests above the patient’s welfare unless there has
been proper disclosure. 26 Thus, the physician’s primary common-law duties are
to act for the welfare of patients within individualized treatment relationships.
Indeed, physicians’ traditional legal duties beyond the duty of loyalty, such
as the duties of care, nonabandonment, and confidentiality, arise only from the
formation of a treatment relationship with a specific patient. As the Restatement
(Third) of Torts explains: “Unlike most duties, the physician’s duty to the patient
is explicitly relational: physicians owe a duty of care to patients.” 27 A more openended duty to improve and safeguard the health of the larger community, and
therefore individuals who are non-patients, rests on less firm footing within the
common-law tradition.
20. See, e.g., Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors’ Orders: Unmasking the Doctor’s Fiduciary Role
in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 451, 464–66 (2000).
21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. § 2 cmt. (b)(1).
22. See Carlson v. SALA Architects, Inc., 732 N.W.2d 324, 331 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007); Gunter
v. Huddle, 724 So. 2d 544, 546 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998).
23. See, e.g., MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS’ CONFLICTS
OF INTEREST 210–11 (1993).
24. E. Haavi Morreim, Redefining Quality by Reassigning Responsibility, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 79, 92
(1994).
25. Maxwell J. Mehlman, Why Physicians Are Fiduciaries for Their Patients, 12 IND. HEALTH L.
REV. 1, 17–30 (2015).
26. Mary Crossley, Infected Judgment: Legal Responses to Physician Bias, 48 VILL. L. REV. 195, 251–
52 (2003).
27. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 41 cmt.
h (AM. L. INST. 2012).
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Even if common law arguably acknowledges physicians as agents of more
than just individual health because of their special skills and capabilities in
population health promotion, 28 physicians might be considered to have a dualloyalty problem—with simultaneous obligations to their individual patients and
to the public. But this offers little leeway for physicians to pursue public health
goals that are in tension with individual patient welfare. The dual-loyalty
problem for physicians is hardly new. In a variety of contexts physicians may
find that they owe concurrent obligations to a third party or to society as a
whole and also to the patient, such as providing employment fitness exams,
caring for team athletes, and providing medical assistance to the state in
administering wartime interrogations. 29 However, the message to physicians in
most dual-loyalty scenarios has invariably been to restructure their roles to
minimize dual-loyalty conflicts 30 or resolve the dual-loyalty problem by putting
patients first. 31
B.

Common-Law Duties to Third Parties

Common law has, at times, recognized a quasi-public health role for
physicians in considering the welfare of third parties potentially endangered by
the patient. Much of this case law concerns physicians treating patients with
infectious disease and whether the physician needs to warn and/or protect third
parties exposed to the patient’s contagion. While this case law occasionally uses
expansive wording in describing physicians’ public health obligations, the actual
contexts in which the duties arise remain quite limited. Moreover,
demonstrating concern with burdening physicians with obligations outside their
relationships with patients, courts have seemed reluctant to impose open-ended,
affirmative duties to act for the welfare of the community.

28. See infra Section I.B.
29. See, e.g., Steve P. Calandrillo, Sports Medicine Conflicts: Team Physicians vs. Athlete-Patients, 50
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 185, 190–92 (2005); Rahul Rajkumar, A Human Rights Approach to Routine ProviderInitiated HIV Testing, 7 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L., & ETHICS 319, 364–65 (2007).
30. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, Holly Fernandez Lynch & Christopher R. Deubert, A Proposal To
Address NFL Club Doctors’ Conflicts of Interest and To Promote Player Trust, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Nov.–
Dec. 2016, at S2, S3 (arguing for severing the sports doctor’s dual loyalties to team and patient by
creating two professional roles: a medical staff doctor with exclusive loyalty to the patient and a club
evaluation doctor with exclusive loyalty to the team).
31. See, e.g., PHYSICIANS FOR HUM. RTS., DUAL LOYALTIES: THE CHALLENGES OF
PROVIDING PROFESSIONAL HEALTH CARE TO IMMIGRATION DETAINEES 5 (2011) (“While the
term ‘dual loyalty’ may imply equivalence between a medical professional’s loyalty to the patient and
loyalty to third party interests, no such equivalence exists. Ethically, with very rare and wellcircumscribed exceptions, a health professional is obligated to act in the interest of the patient above
all other concerns.”); Solomon R. Benatar & Ross E.G. Upshur, Dual Loyalty of Physicians in the Military
and in Civilian Life, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2161, 2161 (2008) (noting that one approach to resolving
physician dual-loyalty problems is that the physician’s “professional responsibility to individuals is
always considered to override responsibility to society”).
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1. Classic Infectious Disease Cases
When a patient has a highly contagious disease, such as tuberculosis or
scarlet fever, courts have traditionally recognized a duty on the physician to
address health risks to the patient’s very close contacts, often family members. 32
Similarly, courts have acknowledged that sexual partners exposed to a patient’s
sexually transmitted disease may bring a claim against the physician for alleged
negligence in advising the patient about the risk of transmission. 33 However,
the case law is somewhat uneven as not all courts have recognized the
physician’s duty to third parties even with highly contagious diseases. 34
Courts seem more likely to sustain claims by infected third parties when
there is an underlying disease-reporting law imposing a statutory obligation on
the physician to notify public health authorities about the illness. This indicates
some legislative intent to protect third parties, providing greater justification
for imposing a legal duty, enforceable under common law, on the physician to
act. As an illustration, courts have recognized a potential cause of action by an
infected neighbor, based in part on a state disease-reporting statute, for the
physician’s alleged failure to diagnose a patient’s smallpox, thus putting the
patient’s neighbors at risk. 35
2. Noninfectious Diseases and Physicians’ Special Role in Public Health
Physicians’ limited legal obligations to non-patients have also been
recognized at times in situations of noninfectious disease. In one case, a court
found a spouse had an actionable claim against a physician for failure to warn
her of her husband’s contraction of Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever. 36 Although
the underlying illness was not considered contagious, the court looked at the
clustering effects and commonly shared sources of exposure, and ultimately
found that the husband’s disease status indicated her increased risk for
contracting the disease. 37 Similarly, courts have analogized to infectious
disease-reporting obligations in finding a physician has a duty to protect the
32. See, e.g., Skillings v. Allen, 173 N.W. 663, 663 (Minn. 1919) (scarlet fever); Hofmann v.
Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752, 753 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (tuberculosis); see also 43 AM. JUR. 2D Proof
of Facts § 3 (2020) (“[A] physician who treats a patient for a communicable disease may be under a duty
to diagnose the disease’s contagious and infectious nature . . . .”).
33. Cf. DiMarco v. Lynch Homes—Chester Cnty., Inc., 583 A.2d 422, 424 (Pa. 1990) (“[I]t is
imperative that the physician give his or her patient the proper advice about preventing the spread of
the disease.”).
34. See, e.g., Britton v. Soltes, 563 N.E.2d 910, 912–13 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
35. Jones v. Stanko, 160 N.E. 456, 457 (Ohio 1928). See generally Tracey A. Bateman, Annotation,
Liability of Doctor or Other Health Practitioner to Third Party Contracting Contagious Disease from Doctor’s
Patient, 3 A.L.R. 5th 370 § 2b (1992) (describing facts and circumstances tending to establish a
physician’s liability to a third party due to the physician’s failure to exercise the requisite degree of care
to protect against exposure to a patient with a contagious disease).
36. Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865, 872–73 (Tenn. 1993).
37. Id. at 872.

99 N.C. L. REV. 923 (2021)

934

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99-4

driving public when prescribing medication that increases the risk of injury to
third parties from the impaired patient’s driving. 38
In these cases addressing physicians’ potential obligations to third parties,
courts have at times used seemingly broad language recognizing and affirming
a critical public health role for private physicians. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania has observed that physicians can powerfully safeguard health
beyond the patient as “[p]hysicians are the first line of defense against the
spread of communicable diseases, because physicians know what measures must
be taken to prevent the infection of others.” 39 More recently, the Connecticut
Supreme Court stated “that such [sanctity of the doctor-patient relationship]
concerns are at their nadir, and a physician’s broader public health obligations
are at their zenith, with respect to the diagnosis and treatment of infectious
diseases.” 40 Indeed, some commentators interpret this case law as recognizing
“a physician has a duty to protect public health.” 41
3. Ultimate Constraints on Public Health Duties
However, a more generalized duty to protect public health lacks a clear
foundation in common law. First, the infectious disease line of cases typically
extends the physician’s duty to a spouse, sexual partner, or other third party
intimate with or in very close nexus to the patient. In other words, the
physician’s duty extends to a specific third party, rather than the public at large.
For example, in Tenuto v. Lederle Laboratories, 42 the New York State Court of
Appeals held that a physician prescribing an infant an oral polio vaccine had a
duty to warn the infant’s parents of the risk of transmission of the virus to the
parents. 43 The court emphasized the physician’s duty extended to the parents
because of their close relationship to the patient, reasoning that
an attending physician is, in a certain sense, in custody of a patient
afflicted with infectious or contagious disease. And he owes a duty to
those who are ignorant of such disease, and who by reason of family ties, or
otherwise, are liable to be brought in contact with the patient, to instruct
and advise . . . them as to the character of the disease. 44

38. See, e.g., Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364, 370–71 (Tex. App. 1983).
39. DiMarco v. Lynch Homes—Chester Cnty., Inc., 583 A.2d 422, 424 (Pa. 1990).
40. Doe v. Cochran, 210 A.3d 469, 488 (Conn. 2019) (finding physician who incorrectly told
patient he tested negative for herpes had actionable duty to patient’s girlfriend who later contracted
the disease).
41. Caitlin A. Schmid, Protecting the Physician in HIV Misdiagnosis Cases, 46 DUKE L.J. 431, 447
(1996) (emphasis added).
42. 687 N.E.2d 1300 (N.Y. 1997).
43. Id. at 1303.
44. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Davis v. Rodman, 226 S.W. 612, 614 (Ark.
1921)).
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This is very different than recognizing a duty to the community at large, where
many individuals may have only more indirect connections to the physician’s
patient.
Second, to the extent there is a legal duty on the physician to act for
identifiable third parties in close nexus to the patient, the common-law duty
described is usually narrowly limited to advising or warning the patient about
her risk to others, as opposed to requiring broader steps. 45 If there were a
generalized, robust duty to protect public health, then one might expect the
duty to be articulated as needing to control the patient to protect the public at
large, which courts have sometimes expressly avoided. 46
Judicial sensitivity to limiting legal duties to defined, fixed orbits, and not
overburdening physicians with infeasible liability pressures to “a prohibitive
number of possible plaintiffs,” 47 has led some later courts to try to clarify and
narrow the scope of earlier infectious disease case law. These later cases try to
make clear that the physician’s duty is usually limited to accurately advising the
patient about the communicable disease and the risk it presents to others. 48 A
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania case, Seebold v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 49
reflects this patient-centered duty. 50 In Seebold, a corrections officer claimed he
was infected with methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus (“MRSA”) after
prison physicians’ allegedly failed to control a MRSA outbreak among patientinmates. 51 The court concluded the physicians’ legal obligation did not extend
to reaching out to third parties, even by warning, and was reluctant “to extend
the requirement for affirmative physician interventions outside the physicianpatient relationship.” 52 Indeed, some courts have exhibited clear discomfort in
imposing a broad duty to third parties if this would cause the physician to
disfavor the interests of the patient. For example, in Webb v. Jarvis, 53 involving
a third party injured by a patient, allegedly as a result of the patient’s aggressive

45. See Doe, 210 A.3d at 491 (holding that although defendant physician had a duty to third-party
plaintiff, the physician “was under no obligation to contact the plaintiff, to otherwise ensure that she
was made aware of [the patient’s] test results, or to do anything other than fulfill his undisputed
professional obligation to accurately convey his patient’s test results to the patient himself”).
46. See, e.g., Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364, 370 (Tex. App. 1983) (“[The physician] may have
had a duty to warn his patient not to drive. We do not hold he had a duty to prevent her from
driving . . . .” (first emphasis added)).
47. McNulty v. City of New York, 792 N.E.2d 162, 166 (N.Y. 2003) (finding doctor treating
patient with meningitis owed no duty of care to patient’s friend who eventually contracted the disease).
48. See Walters v. UPMC Presbyterian Shadyside, 31 Pa. D. & C.5th 281, 292–95 (2013)
(summarizing previous cases).
49. 57 A.3d 1232 (Pa. 2012).
50. Cf. id. at 1243 (refraining from “redefin[ing] the nature of the duty at issue to require
physicians to undertake interventions outside the confidential physician-patient relationship”).
51. Id. at 1234.
52. Id. at 1248 (emphasis added).
53. 575 N.E.2d 992 (Ind. 1991).
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reaction to medication treatment, the Indiana Supreme Court declined to
impose a duty and reasoned,
A physician’s first loyalty must be to his patient. Imposing a duty on a
physician to predict a patient’s behavioral reaction to medication and to
identify possible plaintiffs would cause a divided loyalty. Were we to
impose a duty on a physician to consider the risk of harm to third persons
before prescribing medication to a patient, we would be forcing the
physician to weigh the welfare of unknown persons against the welfare
of his patient. Such an imposition is unacceptable. The physician has the
duty to his patient to decide when and what medication to prescribe to
the patient, and to inform the patient regarding the risks and benefits of
a particular drug therapy. 54
Third, the case law recognizing a physician’s duty to third parties in
infectious disease cases is decidedly mixed and uneven. 55 Some courts have
difficulties extending a physician’s legal obligations to non-patients, even if they
have been in quite foreseeable contact with the physician’s actual patient and
are easily identifiable. 56 Thus, a physician faced no duty to warn the spouse in
a case alleging the physician’s failure to diagnose the patient’s tuberculosis,
because, the court reasoned, “‘[A] physician’s duty of care is ordinarily one owed
to his or her patient’ and does not extend to the ‘community at large.’” 57
4. Tarasoff’s Impact
Discussion of physicians’ duties to protect community health must, of
course, include the infamous Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California 58 and
related case law. In Tarasoff, the Supreme Court of California held that a
psychologist has a duty to protect foreseeable third-party victims when
reasonably determining that a patient poses a serious danger of violence to
others. 59 The Tarasoff court noted its holding was consistent with the earlier
infectious disease case law in other jurisdictions imposing liability on physicians
to third parties who contracted the patient’s contagious disease. 60 Foreseeability
of harm seemed very important to the court’s imposition of a duty, despite

54. Id. at 997.
55. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 41
cmt. h (AM. L. INST. 2012) (“Some of the obligations of physicians to third parties, such as with
patients who are HIV-infected, have been addressed by legislatures. In other areas, the case law is
sufficiently mixed, the factual circumstances sufficiently varied . . . .”).
56. Ellis v. Peter, 211 A.D.2d 353, 353 (N.Y. 1995).
57. Id. at 356 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (first quoting Purdy v. Pub. Adm’r of
Westchester Cnty., 526 N.E.2d 4, 8 (N.Y. 1988); and then quoting Eiseman v. New York, 511 N.E.2d
1128, 1135 (N.Y. 1987)).
58. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
59. Id. at 346.
60. Id. at 344.
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uncertain therapeutic standards for accurately predicting patient violence. 61
This foreseeability emphasis, as well as the opinion’s linking to earlier infectious
disease cases, and that the facts involved noninfectious mental illness, 62
seemingly opened the door to imposing duties on health care providers to nonpatients in many situations where action could possibly mitigate risk and
safeguard community health.
However, Tarasoff and its progeny really do not support the notion of a
physician’s broader duty to protect the health of the population. Despite its
wide renown, a fair number of jurisdictions decline to follow Tarasoff and do
not recognize a duty on mental health care providers in similar situations. 63
Meanwhile, certain courts following Tarasoff hold that the duty of protection
and/or warning is owed only to victims “who are identifiable with a significant
degree of specificity.” 64 This undercuts the notion that the physician owes a
duty to protect the community’s health as there is a big leap from specifically
identifiable third parties at risk to general members of the public. Additionally,
some courts have distinguished Tarasoff and its progeny as limited to the unique,
special relationship between a mental health provider and the patient, and state
that such case law “cannot reasonably serve as a springboard for the imposition
of new and broader duties upon healthcare providers vis-à-vis third-party nonpatients.” 65
One way to understand the distinctiveness of the special relationship
recognized in Tarasoff arises from the mental health care provider’s assumption
of some degree of control over and highly personal connection with the patient,
elements not necessarily existing to the same extent in other doctor-patient
relationships. 66 For example, the typical mental health patient has “some degree
of decreased capacity of self-control” 67 and the therapist has the option of civilly
committing the mental health patient. 68 In contrast, the regular physician does

61. Id. at 345.
62. Id. at 344.
63. Kuligoski v. Brattleboro Retreat, 156 A.3d 436, 469 (Vt. 2016) (noting that many states have
departed from Tarasoff through statutory limitations on the mental health professional’s duty).
64. Peter H. Schuck & Daniel J. Givelber, Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.: The Therapist’s
Dilemma, in TORTS STORIES 99, 127 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003).
65. Seebold v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 57 A.3d 1232, 1244 (Pa. 2012).
66. Cf., e.g., Shortnacy v. N. Atlanta Internal Med., P.C., 556 S.E.2d 209, 214 (Ga. Ct. App.
2001) (finding no duty in a case where an injured third party alleged the physician owed him a duty
when prescribing patient-driver a narcotic analgesic—the court recognized “control over the patient as
the touchstone for imposing this [physician] duty to third parties” and finding no duty because such
control was lacking in this doctor-patient relationship).
67. W. Jonathan Cardi, A Pluralistic Analysis of the Therapist/Physician Duty To Warn Third Parties,
44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 877, 889 (2009).
68. Id. at 891.
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not have an “intimate knowledge of a patient’s life,” and the patient may be just
as capable of exercising self-control to address the harm to others. 69
Relatedly, the Restatement (Third) of Torts expressly recognizes affirmative
duties by mental health providers to third parties at risk from patients, but
treats nonmental health professionals differently. 70 Instead, it “leaves to further
development the question of when [nonmental health] physicians have a duty
to use reasonable care or some more limited duty—such as to warn only the
patient—to protect third parties.” 71 This further suggests that the grounds are
weak for extending a Tarasoff-like duty beyond the unique mental health setting
to a wider range of potential public health scenarios. 72
C.

Medical Practice Acts and Professional Licensure

Physicians have statutory and regulatory duties connected with the legal
authority the government grants them to practice medicine. But this does not
necessarily encompass broad public health obligations. Most state medical
practice acts are patient focused and condition a physician’s ability to engage in
the licensed practice of medicine on maintaining minimum quality standards in
connection with services rendered to actual patients. For example, Ohio’s
medical practice act provides that physicians can face licensure restriction for
grounds primarily tied to direct patient care such as “inability to practice
according to acceptable and prevailing standards of care by reason of mental
illness or physical illness,” departure from minimal standards of care followed
by similar physicians, failure to follow standards related to drug selection and
administration, and violating patient confidentiality. 73
Only a handful of state medical practice acts extend further and expressly
envision the licensed physician engaging in public health protection. As
discussed further below, some licensing statutes provide that a physician’s
failure to comply with infectious disease-reporting laws can trigger licensure
discipline. 74 Beyond this link to disease reporting, very few physician licensure

69. Id.
70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 41(b)(4) (AM. L. INST. 2012).
71. Id. § 41 cmt. h.
72. The Restatement (Third) of Torts commentary discusses possible public health duties to third
parties, such as when a physician cares for an HIV patient who poses risk to others. Id. But it notes
that statutes may address some of these duties and that the case law and policy considerations are mixed
when considering whether physicians have clear affirmative duties under common law to non-patient
third parties. Id. (“Physicians’ reporting obligations for patients who are HIV-positive have been
addressed by statute in virtually all states.”).
73. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(B) (LEXIS through File 3 (SB 22) of the 134th (2021–
2022) Gen. Assemb.).
74. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-21 (Westlaw through L.2021, c. 32 and J.R. No. 1) (providing
that engaging in professional misconduct is punishable by license suspension); N.J. ADMIN. CODE
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statutes expressly address other public health conduct, and those situations seem
to be ad hoc. An increasing number of medical practice acts, such as North
Carolina’s, permit physicians to prescribe opioid antagonists, such as naloxone,
to non-patients, including family members of individuals at risk of opioid
overdose and others who are likely to be in a position to assist individuals at
risk, to prevent overdoses. 75 New York’s medical practice act permits physicians
to prescribe generalized regimens to nurses and pharmacists for administering
immunizations and performing identification tests with non-patients for
infectious diseases such as influenza, pertussis disease, and hepatitis C virus. 76
On the one hand, licensure provisions as in New York and North Carolina
provide a direct legal connection between physician action and non-patients.
On the other hand, the statutory language is permissive, rather than a binding
obligation. Thus, the familiar pattern occurs yet again: physicians’ public health
duties are ephemeral in contrast to their more salient, binding obligations to
actual patients.
There is open-ended “harm to the public” language in some medical
practice acts that could be expansively read to impose additional public health
obligations on physicians. For example, Illinois’ medical practice act provides
that physicians should avoid “unprofessional conduct of a character likely to
deceive, defraud or harm the public.” 77 Similarly, the Federation of State
Medical Boards (“FSMB”) published a model medical practice act provides that
a physician may face licensure discipline for “conduct likely to . . . harm the
public,” or “any conduct that may be harmful to the patient or the public.” 78
Such language arguably makes attention to population health risks a
physician’s statutory responsibility, as disregard for these risks can materialize
as harm to the public. However, the ultimate impact of these statutory
provisions is in fact quite modest. First, a fair number of physician-licensing
statutes do not follow the FSMB model and avoid the very broad “harm to the
public” disciplinary standard. Second, even if on the books, medical boards do
not regularly enforce a harm-to-the-public standard. To start, physician
discipline for any licensure statute violation remains quite rare. Estimates
suggest that state medical boards discipline only 5 in 1,000 physicians per year,
and only approximately 1.1 per 1,000 physicians receive severe sanctions such

§ 13:35-6.24 (LEXIS through the New Jersey Reg., Vol. 53 No. 7, Apr. 5, 2021) (providing that failure
to comply with disease-reporting requirements can be considered professional misconduct).
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-12.7(b) (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2021-4 of the 2021 Reg. Sess. of
the Gen. Assemb.).
76. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6527(6)–(7) (Westlaw through L.2021, chs. 1 to 49, 61 to 91).
77. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/22(A)(5) (Westlaw through P.A. 101-659).
78. ESSENTIALS OF A STATE MED. & OSTEOPATHIC PRAC. ACT § IX(D)(4), (52) (FED’N OF
STATE MED. BDS. 2015), https://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/advocacy/policies/essentials-of-a-statemedical-and-osteopathic-practice-act.pdf [https://perma.cc/G66H-JVU8].
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as revocation or suspension of their license. 79 The overwhelming majority of
serious medical licensure actions involve complaints of physicians impaired by
drugs and alcohol, engaged in sexual relations with patients, and other quality
of care concerns. 80 There is a noteworthy dearth of professional licensure
actions for conduct involving harm to non-patients and the health of the
community.
Finally, a fair number of medical practice acts condition the physician’s
license on complying with the ethics of the medical profession. Ohio’s licensing
statute, for example, provides that physicians may face licensure discipline for
violating the American Medical Association’s Code of Medical Ethics (“AMA
Code”). 81 Similarly, North Carolina’s licensing statute subjects a physician to
potential discipline for “failure to conform to . . . the ethics of the medical
profession, irrespective of whether or not a patient is injured thereby.” 82 Thus,
if medical ethics and the honorable standards of the profession direct physicians
to safeguard public health, then failure to do so could also be considered a
licensure violation. This would be the case even if no patient harm occurred.
The extent to which medical ethical directives can be considered binding
legal obligations, because medical practice acts reference such ethical standards,
is much debated. Some commentators assert that private professional
associations, such as the American Medical Association (“AMA”), have no legal
role in directing the practice of medicine through licensing statutes and that
violations of such associations’ ethical codes are not strong grounds for
jeopardizing the physician’s license. 83 However, other commentators see a
firmer legal foundation, particularly for the AMA Code, and contend that it has
“been adopted as an authoritative source of a physicians’ professional
responsibilities by many state licensing boards and courts.” 84
To the extent these ethical standards are at least influential in
understanding the full scope of physicians’ legal duties, it is helpful to consider
medical ethics guidance regarding physicians as agents of community health.
79. James M. Dubois, Emily A. Anderson, John T. Chibnall, Leanne Diakov, David J. Doukas,
Eric S. Holmboe, Heidi M. Koenig, Joan H. Krause, Gianna McMillan, Marc Mendelsohn, Jessica
Mozersky, William A. Norcross & Alison J. Whelan, Preventing Egregious Ethical Violations in Medical
Practice: Evidence-Informed Recommendations from a Multidisciplinary Working Group, 104 J. MED. REG.
23, 23 (2018).
80. James M. Dubois, Emily E. Anderson, John T. Chibnall, Jessica Mozersky & Heidi A. Walsh,
Serious Ethical Violations in Medicine: A Statistical and Ethical Analysis of 280 Cases in the United States
from 2008–2016, 19 AM. J. BIOETHICS 16, 16 (2019).
81. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(B) (LEXIS through File 3 (SB 22) of the 134th (2020–
2021) Gen. Assemb.).
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14(a)(6) (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2021-4 of the 2021 Reg. Sess. of
the Gen. Assemb.).
83. Carl H. Coleman, Beyond the Call of Duty: Compelling Health Care Professionals To Work During
an Influenza Pandemic, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1, 22 (2008).
84. Orentlicher, supra note 4, at 1459.
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Moreover, in situations where the law may not provide a clear answer about
physicians’ public health duties, the ethical provisions become all the more
important, pragmatically, as a source of authority in directing physician
behavior because parties may turn to the ethical standards for additional
guidance. Thus, more detailed consideration of how medical ethics addresses
physicians’ public health duties is in order, and the next part takes up this
analysis. 85
D.

Other Statutory Duties

In contrast to medical practice acts, various other statutes provide clearer
legal foundation for physicians’ public heath responsibilities, albeit in narrow
contexts. First, some statutes impose direct public health surveillance
responsibilities on treating clinicians, such as laws that require reporting of
communicable disease, 86 child abuse and neglect, 87 and elder abuse. 88 Failure to
comply with reporting obligations can subject a physician to licensure discipline
in several states. 89 However, as discussed further below, compliance with
disease-reporting laws has been poor and enforcement weak. 90
Some statutes permit commandeering the services of private physicians in
the declaration of a public health emergency. For example, the Model State
Emergency Health Powers Act, 91 adopted in varying form in several states,
provides state public health authorities the power to require physicians to assist
with vaccination, testing, examination, and treatment of individuals. 92 But such
commandeering statutes typically apply only in the context of a discrete,
declared public health emergency, not to the more mundane, daily treatment

85. See infra Part II.
86. See infra Section III.C.
87. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166(a) (2021) (requiring physicians to report known or
suspected instances of child abuse or neglect).
88. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15630 (2021) (requiring physicians to report known
or observed instances of elder abuse or neglect).
89. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6530 (Westlaw through L.2021, chs. 1 to 49, 61 to 91) (stating
that failure to report constitutes professional misconduct); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 230-a (Westlaw
through L.2021, chs. 1 to 49, 61 to 91) (providing that engaging in professional misconduct subjects a
physician to licensure revocation).
90. See infra Section III.C.
91. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY POWERS ACT (CTR. FOR L. & THE PUB.’S HEALTH AT
GEORGETOWN & JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVS., Discussion Draft 2001), https://www.aapsonline.org/
legis/msehpa2.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5JK-DNE3].
92. See NETWORK FOR PUB. HEALTH L., THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH
POWERS ACT: SUMMARY MATRIX 1–8, https://www.networkforphl.org/wp-content/uploads/
2020/01/Emergency-Declaration-Authorities.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TAV-X6QB] (providing “state
statutory and regulatory authorities for emergency declarations in all 50 U.S. States and the District of
Columbia”); see also Judith C. Ahronheim, Service by Health Care Providers in a Public Health Emergency:
The Physician’s Duty and the Law, 12 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 195, 229 (2009).
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decisions arising in clinical practice that, nonetheless, may also impact
community health significantly.
Physicians providing on-call service at a Medicare-participating hospital
may also have an obligation to treat individuals during a public health
emergency under the Federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act (“EMTALA”). 93 But the ultimate reach of this statutory duty remains quite
constrained as EMTALA applies only when individuals present at a hospital
emergency room. 94 In regular clinical practice, outside of the emergency room
context, the common-law view of the doctor-patient relationship as contractual
in nature gives physicians considerable leeway to decline to start a treatment
relationship for any reason or no real reason at all. 95 This presumably grants
physicians discretion to refuse to care for an individual, even when the
underlying health condition, if left untreated, poses additional health risks to
the community.
II. MEDICAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL NORMS AMPLIFYING PATIENT
PRIMACY
Law is not the only, or even most significant, influence on physician
behavior. Among other factors, physicians’ sense of their professional ethical
obligations, as well as what they perceive their peers do, can matter
considerably. Thus, in accounting for the elusiveness of physicians’ public
health responsibilities, it is also important to consider these additional
perspectives. Medical ethics and professional norms reinforce and amplify law’s
patient-primacy directive. While nominally acknowledging physicians’ public
health obligations, medical ethics and professional norms more frequently
downgrade physicians’ public health activities when in tension with patientcentered responsibilities.
A.

Traditional Medical Ethics

According to traditional medical ethics, the doctor-patient relationship
serves as the linchpin for the origin and scope of a physician’s ethical
obligations. 96 The AMA Code treats the physician’s role as inherently patientcentered because “[t]he practice of medicine . . . is fundamentally a moral
activity that arises from the imperative to care for patients and to alleviate

93. See Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9121,
100 Stat. 82, 164–67 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd).
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Oliver v. Brock, 342 So. 2d 1, 3 (Ala. 1976).
96. As previously noted, there are differing opinions on whether professional ethical codes and
directives are considered binding legal obligations on physicians. See supra Section I.C.
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suffering.” 97 Interestingly, the AMA Code has not always been so feeble
regarding the physician’s public health role. The first version of the AMA Code,
from 1847, took a rather firm stand on the necessity of physicians addressing
infectious disease outbreaks threatening the community, even if this meant
putting themselves at risk. 98 It advised that “when pestilence prevails, it is
[physicians’] duty to face the danger, and to continue their labors for the
alleviation of the suffering, even at the jeopardy of their own lives.” 99
In contrast, the current AMA Code makes physicians’ public health duties
more obscure. Among the AMA Code’s nine core principles is a seemingly bold
endorsement of a robust public health role for the physician: “A physician shall
recognize a responsibility to participate in activities contributing to the
improvement of the community and the betterment of public health.” 100 Note
the rather weakened effect of the indirect phrasing, however, as the physician
is advised merely to recognize a public health responsibility as opposed to
actually having to undertake it to a meaningful degree. Further, the next
immediately following core principle significantly undercuts physicians’
obligations to improve public health as it instructs that “[a] physician shall,
while caring for the patient, regard responsibility to the patient as paramount.” 101
Thus, any public health role envisioned by the AMA Code’s core principles is
fairly read to be secondary and inferior to the clearer command for the physician
to act primarily for the patient being treated. More to the point, the AMA Code
regards the doctor-patient relationship as so sacrosanct and rooted in trust that
it obligates physicians to “place patients’ welfare above the physician’s own selfinterest or obligations to others.” 102 Thus, physicians’ responsibilities to safeguard
the health of the community take a backseat to caring for individual patients.
The AMA Code underwent significant revisions in 2016, including,
importantly, a reorganized series of ethics opinions in Chapter 8 that addresses
“Opinions On Physicians [and] the Health of the Community.” 103 These
opinions describe various public health obligations for physicians, such as
participating in routine universal patient screening for HIV, assessing patients’
fitness to drive, providing urgent medical care during disasters, and
participating in use of quarantine and isolation procedures to control infectious

97. CODE OF MED. ETHICS ch. 1, Ethics Op. 1.1.1 (AM. MED. ASS’N 2017), https://www.amaassn.org/delivering-care/ethics/patient-physician-relationships [https://perma.cc/47R8-TSUT].
98. CODE OF MED. ETHICS art. 1, § 1 (AM. MED. ASS’N 1847).
99. Id.
100. CODE OF MED. ETHICS, AMA PRINCIPLES OF MED. ETHICS § VII (AM. MED. ASS’N
2001), https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/principles-of-medicalethics.pdf [https://perma.cc/5X6Z-4URQ].
101. Id. § VIII (emphasis added).
102. CODE OF MED. ETHICS ch. 1, Ethics Op. 1.1.1 (emphasis added).
103. CODE OF MED. ETHICS, ch. 8.
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disease outbreaks. 104 The AMA webpage introducing this revised Chapter 8
promotes physicians as strong public health guardians by explaining
“[p]hysicians have a long-recognized responsibility to participate in activities to
protect and promote the health of the public.” 105
Yet much of this guidance pays mere lip service to physicians’ public
health role. The “long-recognized” public health duties are immediately
attenuated by the physician’s need to care for her patients. The Chapter 8
webpage further cautions that “[p]hysicians must balance dual responsibilities
to promote the welfare and confidentiality of the individual patient and to
protect public safety.” 106 This suggests the physician has dual duties—to the
patient and to public health—without much guidance as to how to reconcile any
tensions. The actual ethics opinions within Chapter 8 go further, however, in
making clear that the public health role remains necessarily inferior. For
example, Ethics Opinion 8.1, dealing with the importance of physician
participation in routine universal screening of patients for HIV, begins the
analysis with the starting assumption that “[p]hysicians’ primary ethical
obligation is to their individual patients” 107 and thus advises that HIV screening
include opt-out provisions for patients and that physicians should respect a
patient’s informed refusal to be tested for HIV as part of routine screening. 108
Likewise, Ethics Opinion 8.4, addressing physicians’ public health
responsibilities to consider use of quarantine and isolation to reduce infectious
disease outbreaks, makes clear that physicians’ obligations to the patient remain
superior. 109 The opinion notes that “[a]lthough physicians’ primary ethical
obligation is to their individual patients, they also have a long-recognized public
health responsibility. . . . [T]his may include the use of quarantine and isolation
to . . . protect the health of the public.” 110 Elsewhere in the Chapter 8 ethics
opinions, physicians’ public health duties are ambiguously referenced as
concurrent with their obligations to individual patients, but again no guidance
is given about how to reconcile any dual-obligation problems. 111 More
importantly, nowhere within the Chapter 8 ethics opinions is there any

104. Id.
105. Code of Medical Ethics: Physicians & the Health of the Community, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://
www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/code-medical-ethics-physicians-health-community [https://
perma.cc/T7X4-G6CT].
106. Id.
107. CODE OF MED. ETHICS ch. 8, Ethics Op. 8.1.
108. Id.
109. Id. ch. 8, Ethics Op. 8.4.
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. See, e.g., id. ch. 8, Ethics Op. 8.2 (“In deciding whether or how to intervene when a patient’s
medical condition may impair driving, physicians must balance dual responsibilities to promote the
welfare and confidentiality of the individual patient, and to protect public safety.”).
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indication when physicians’ public health duties will ever eclipse and outweigh
their obligations to individual patients. 112
Analogous to public health protection is the expectation that physicians
should adopt conscious practice strategies in order to help control health care
spending. In this context, the AMA ethics guidance offers some support for
relaxing patient primacy in favor of larger societal interests. 113 It is not clear,
however, that this guidance is intended to apply to physician’s specific public
health activities. Moreover, recognizing physicians have dual obligations,
without providing clearer indication when societal interests must take center
stage, still results in underpowered public health obligations.
The failure of traditional medical ethics to support more robust public
health duties for physicians, and its seeming enfeeblement of such duties by
obfuscation, should not surprise. Organized medicine has historically had a
tense relationship with public health. In earlier decades, private physicians
viewed public health workers’ attempts at professionalization with suspicion
and warily regarded the public health movement’s appeals to community
protection as a means to introduce controversial health insurance programs and
to assert control over individual medical practice. 114 Also contributing to this
tension was public health linking disease prevention to the “higher rights” of
the community, and its advocacy for mass intervention programs, which
seemingly undercut the doctor-patient relationship so central to medical
practice. 115
In addition, traditional medical ethics’ emphasis on values such as
autonomy, civil liberty, and antipaternalism remains at odds with public heath’s
more communitarian orientation. 116 Traditional medical ethics’ strong concern
with individual autonomy and patient beneficence, in particular, contrasts with
public health’s attention to how health-related risks and benefits impact entire

112. See id. ch. 8.
113. See AM. MED. ASS’N, Opinion 9.0652 - Physician Stewardship of Health Care Resources,
reprinted in 17 AMA J. ETHICS 1044, 1044 (2015); AM. MED. ASS’N, REPS. OF THE COUNCIL ON
ETHICAL & JUD. AFFS., PHYSICIAN STEWARDSHIP OF HEALTH CARE RESOURCES
(2012), https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/public/hod/a12-cejareports_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/MM76-95PY]. According to the AMA report, the singular patient
welfare view does not reflect the realities of clinical practice and overlooks physicians’ distinct
obligations to promote public health and access to care generally. Id.
114. Daniel M. Fox, From TB to AIDS: Value Conflicts in Reporting Disease, 16 HASTINGS CTR. REP.
11, 13 (1986).
115. Id. at 13; A.R. Ruis & Robert N. Golden, The Schism Between Medical and Public Health
Education: A Historical Perspective, 83 ACAD. MED. 1153, 1154 (2008).
116. Daniel Callahan & Bruce Jennings, Ethics and Public Health: Forging a Strong Relationship, 92
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 169, 170 (2002).
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populations. 117 Public health ends up placing higher ethical priority on utility
and intrinsic outcomes than traditional medical ethics. 118
In some respects, medical ethics guidance resembles ethical standards from
other professions because of the shared emphasis on relational obligations and
loyalty to the professional’s “client.” For example, traditional legal ethics
generally instructed the attorney to put the client’s interests first and expected
very little of lawyers in terms of the interests of the community. Under the
traditional view, “the only ethical duty distinctive to the lawyer’s role is loyalty
to the client. Legal ethics impose no responsibilities to third parties or the
public different from that of the minimal compliance with law that is required
of everyone.” 119 The updated American Bar Association Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (“ABA Model Rules”) are more ambivalent about the
lawyer’s primary role as zealous advocate, contending that a lawyer, in addition
to a representative of the client, acts as “a public citizen having special
responsibility for the quality of justice.” 120 Attorneys also have duties as
“officers of the court” that may conflict with zealous client representation, such
as not making false statements to a tribunal and not advising opposing parties
unrepresented by counsel. 121 These extra client responsibilities are largely about
the lawyer’s conduct in preserving the integrity of the adjudicative process and
legal institutions. 122
One might question why determining physician’s responsibilities beyond
the patient is really any different or more difficult than how the legal profession
addresses the question of duties beyond the client. However, the physician’s
role is not really comparable to the lawyer’s more constrained function of
advocacy within a dispute resolution system, raising doubts about the usefulness
117. Lawrence O. Gostin & Lindsey F. Wiley, Public Health Ethics and Law, HASTINGS CTR.
BIOETHICS BRIEFINGS (Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.thehastingscenter.org/briefingbook/publichealth/ [https://perma.cc/7HZS-HBTP].
118. Anna C. Mastroianni, Jeffrey P. Kahn & Nancy E. Kass, Public Health Ethics: An Introduction
and Overview, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC HEALTH ETHICS, at xxxii (Anna C.
Mastroianni, Jeffrey P. Kahn & Nancy E. Kass eds., 2019).
119. WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 8
(1998).
120. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl. § 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). The ABA Model
Rules also temper the lawyer’s zealous advocacy role by stating such advocacy must still be “within the
bounds of law, while maintaining a professional, courteous and civil attitude toward all persons
involved in the legal system.” Id. pmbl. § 9; see also David Luban, Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics, 51
STAN. L. REV. 873, 883–84 (1999).
121. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.3; MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.3;
Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 60–61 (1989).
122. One possible exception is Rule 1.6(b)—the ethical rule permitting lawyers to breach client
confidences to prevent reasonably certain death, substantial bodily harm, or crime/fraud in which the
lawyer’s services were used. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6(b). Rule 1.6(b) more directly
prevents community members from harm, as much as it helps preserve the integrity of legal dispute
resolution. However, Rule 1.6(b) is permissive, not a binding duty, and in any event applies only in
very limited factual scenarios.
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of generalizing from legal ethics to medical ethics. 123 Also, private physicians
might be thought to have more robust societal obligations because of their quasipublic status, given their participation in governmental health care programs
like Medicare and their role as gatekeeper to limited health care resources.
Further, medical ethics is ultimately distinguishable from legal ethics in how it
treats the professional’s responsibilities to society. Lawyers’ ethical
responsibilities to society seem largely directed at preserving the institutional
integrity of the judicial system and the quality of the adjudicative process, so
that all deserving parties using legal services may secure justice. But
conventional medical ethics expressly mentions physicians’ obligations to better
public health as an independent responsibility of the professional, not
necessarily connected to caring for the patient or safeguarding particular health
care institutions. 124 Medical ethics seemingly endorses a larger, autonomous
role for physicians to act for the interests of the populace, yet significantly
undermines this role by also insisting that physicians always prioritize patient
care. Thus, medical ethics ultimately makes the question of the professional’s
community responsibilities far more elusive. Following this guidance,
physicians must struggle with the incongruity of “being a perfect agent for the
patient and being the protector of society.” 125
B.

Public Health Ethics

Newer professional guidance, beyond the AMA Code, attempts to address
more squarely the ethical tensions that arise in public health practice and
safeguarding the community at large. For example, the Public Health
Leadership Society Code (“PHLS Code”) developed by the Public Health
Leadership Society, 126 and formally adopted by the American Public Health
Association, 127 notes that “[t]he concerns of public health are not fully
consonant with those of medicine, . . . thus we cannot simply translate the
[traditional] principles of medical ethics to public health. . . . [I]n contrast to
medicine, public health is concerned more with populations than with

123. See William M. Sage, Physicians as Advocates, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 1529, 1532 (1999) (“To a
lawyer, advocating for clients means playing a focused, instrumental part in a broader social system of
dispute resolution. Doctors do not see their role as similarly limited. Rather, physicians have served as
counsel, judge, and jury—articulating possibilities, presenting and weighing evidence, balancing
competing considerations, and arriving at a decision as to the manner in which the resources of the
health care system should be brought to bear on illness or injury.”).
124. See supra notes 100–05 and accompanying text.
125. Sage, supra note 123, at 1578.
126. See PUB. HEALTH LEADERSHIP SOC’Y, PRINCIPLES OF THE ETHICAL PRACTICE
OF PUBLIC HEALTH (2002), https://www.apha.org/-/media/files/pdf/membergroups/ethics/ethics
_brochure.ashx [https://perma.cc/PAL9-6XEV].
127. See James C. Thompson, Michael Sage, Jack Dillenberg & V. James Guillory, A Code of Ethics
for Public Health, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1057, 1058 (2002).
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individuals.” 128 As previously noted, the AMA Code recognizes physicians have
public health and individual patient responsibilities, but in rather wishy-washy
fashion states these dual obligations should be “balanced” without saying much
more how to do so or, alternatively, makes quite plain the higher priority of
individual patient welfare. In contrast, the PHLS Code provides support for
tipping the balance more readily in favor of community interests:
[There is] the common need in public health to weigh the concerns of
both the individual and the community. There is no ethical principle that
can provide a solution to this perennial tension in public health. We can
highlight, however, that the interest of the community is part of the
equation, and for public health it is the starting place in the equation; it is the
primary interest of public health. 129
While offering a provocative alternative perspective to the AMA Code
about the dual-obligation problems for physicians in addressing individual
versus public health, the PHLS Code likely holds little sway over community
physicians. It is not even necessarily applicable to private physicians in ordinary
clinical settings. The PHLS Code follows the longstanding sharp division
between individual medicine and public health, stating that it is intended
primarily for “public and other institutions . . . that have an explicit public
health mission,” whereas regular clinicians are advised merely that they “may
also find the [PHLS] Code relevant and useful.” 130
C.

Medical Norms

Medicine’s professional norms also slight the health needs of the
community in favor of patient primacy. New physicians become members of a
medical culture that emphasizes fidelity to, and doing the best possible for, the
patient at hand. Indeed, most medical school graduates take formal pledges to
put the patient’s welfare first, with common language such as “[t]he health and
life of my patient will be my first consideration.” 131 Acting as a gatekeeper and
other public health-oriented actions fit awkwardly with this sense of
professional mission. 132
Part of medical culture’s discomfort with public health arises from how
physicians are educated and trained. Medical education historically paid little
attention to public health topics. Influential groups such as the Institute of
Medicine have called for medical schools to provide greater training in public
128. PUB. HEALTH LEADERSHIP SOC’Y, supra note 126, at 5.
129. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
130. Id. at 1.
131. See Audiey C. Kao & Kayhan P. Parsi, Content Analyses of Oaths Administered at U.S. Medical
Schools in 2000, 79 ACAD. MED. 882, 884 (2004).
132. JEROME GROOPMAN, HOW DOCTORS THINK 82 (2007) (“Alas, serving as a gatekeeper to
limit access is not what most doctors envisioned when they chose primary care.”).
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health and population-based prevention strategies. 133 Indeed, there is a growing
consensus that “contemporary health challenges facing physicians will not be
solved by clinical care alone. In our increasingly complex healthcare
environment, physicians will need to integrate population-based management
strategies . . . to optimally meet direct care needs . . . .” 134 However, effective
integration of public health into the medical school curriculum has proven quite
challenging for many reasons, including competing demands of more
conventional medical topics, and medical students report dissatisfaction with
their training in core public health competencies. 135
Further, the fact that much of physicians’ work is treatment oriented
around particular episodes of care makes it harder for physicians to adopt
population-based perspectives in their decision-making. The understandable
default norm is to deal with the patient at hand, case by case. As the ACS noted
in its COVID-19 pandemic guidance:
Most physicians . . . are used to making decisions based on what is best
for each individual patient. . . . [Now i]t is no longer a matter of what
will be best for each individual patient, but rather, what is best for the
group. . . . [I]t is an approach to which many of us are unaccustomed. 136
Indeed, medical norms encourage physicians to treat individual patients
differently from abstract groups of patients or the “community” at large.
Studies indicate that physicians have stronger feelings of obligation to help
individually known patients, as opposed to more diffuse groups like future
patients or the general public. 137 This reflects the centrality of the healing
relationship with patients to physicians’ sense of professional identity. Just as
health law more readily finds the physicians’ duties arising from and defined in
relation to an individual patient, physicians themselves apparently feel a greater
sense of obligation to patients actively under their care, not other groups and,
therefore, not the populace. This is consistent with the higher value often placed

133. INST. OF MED., WHO WILL KEEP THE PUBLIC HEALTHY?: EDUCATING PUBLIC HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 135 (Kristine Gebbie, Linda Rosenstock & Lyla M.
Hernandez eds., 2003).
134. Christopher P. Morley, Scott R. Rosas, Ranit Mishori, William Jordan, Yumi Shitama Jarris,
Fam. Med./Pub. Health Competencies Work Grp. & Jacob Prunuskee, Essential Public Health
Competencies for Medical Students: Establishing a Consensus in Family Medicine, 29 TEACHING &
LEARNING MED. 255, 255 (2017) (footnote omitted).
135. Kevin Correll Keith, Bethany Carlos, Michele Friesinger, Kemp Anderson, Kelsey Wilson,
Donna Kern, Debra Hazen-Martin & Chanita Hughes-Halbert, Student Perspectives on Public Health
Education in Undergraduate Medical Education, 15 DIVERSITY & EQUITY HEALTH CARE 234, 239
(2018); Morley et al., supra note 134, at 261–62.
136. Ethical Considerations, AM. COLL. SURGEONS (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.facs.org/covid19/newsletter/032420/ethics [https://perma.cc/A3KU-RWWQ].
137. See Donald A. Redelmeier & Amos Tversky, Discrepancy Between Medical Decisions for
Individual Patients and for Groups, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1162, 1163 (1990).
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on identifiable rather than statistical lives, a bias that complicates effective
policy making in public health. 138
III. RISK EXTERNALIZATION TO THE PUBLIC
The patient-primacy directive, combined with the elusiveness of
physicians’ public health duties, enables externalization of health risks from
patients to the population at large. This problematic risk externalization occurs
not only during times of public health crisis like the COVID-19 pandemic, but
also in more seemingly stable periods. Indeed, the risks are often insidious,
presenting ongoing threats to community health. This part considers examples
across the wide public health space: COVID-19, antibiotic resistance, infectious
disease reporting, opioid prescribing, and gun violence.
A.

COVID-19

One important public health strategy deployed during the COVID-19
pandemic has been delay of elective procedures for non-COVID-19 patients.
This can help minimize virus transmission opportunities and preserve the
health care system’s limited capacity, including equipment and staffing, for
fighting COVID-19. Of course, the term “elective” is somewhat misleading and
highly contestable, as seen by controversies and differing court opinions
regarding attempts by some states to halt abortions as elective procedures. 139
Rather than a binary choice between clearly elective and nonelective, most
medical procedures likely align on a spectrum from emergency to urgent to
essential to nonessential, and delays present varying degrees of impediment and
risk to different patients undergoing the same procedures.
In March 2020, a growing public health consensus emerged favoring a
pause in nonessential care. Governmental agencies like the CDC and
professional associations like the ACS issued recommendations along these
lines. 140 Eventually, many states moved beyond the advisory stage and imposed

138. Id. at 1164.
139. Compare S. Wind Women’s Ctr. LLC v. Stitt, 455 F. Supp. 3d 1219, 1231 (W.D. Okla. 2020)
(holding abortions to be elective, but counter to the governor’s COVID-19 directive, that prohibiting
them would cause imminent, irreparable harm, thus permitting some abortions to be performed), with
In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018, 1031 (8th Cir. 2020) (upholding an Arkansas COVID-19 emergency
directive that all nonemergency surgical procedures, including surgical abortions, be postponed).
140. COVID-19: Recommendations for Management of Elective Surgical Procedures, AM.
COLL. SURGEONS (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.facs.org/covid-19/clinical-guidance/elective-surgery
[https://perma.cc/4QZD-VMEW]. For the more recent CDC guidance, see Interim Guidance for
Healthcare Facilities: Preparing for Community Transmission of COVID-19 in the United States, supra note
2.
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uniform restrictions on elective procedures, often through executive orders
from governors and state health departments. 141
Interestingly, before states imposed more uniform restrictions, and yet
while the community health risks of elective procedures were highlighted in
vigorous public debate, 142 several physicians continued to perform procedures
generally considered less essential and nonurgent, like spinal decompression
and Tommy John surgery. 143 These physicians defended their conduct based on
doing the best for the patients under their care. For example, Dr. Neal
ElAttrache, a highly regarded orthopedic surgeon and president of the
American Orthopaedic Society for Sports Medicine, performed Tommy John
surgery on several athletes during this period. 144 Acknowledging the public
health risks, he maintained that he was obligated to cure his patients and
remained focused on how delays would affect them personally, observing,
“[Y]ou have somebody’s career at stake and they lose two seasons instead of
one.” 145 Likewise, many dermatology practices remained open in late March,
despite public health calls to limit such in-person care, and in apparent
contradiction of guidelines from the American Academy of Dermatology to
reschedule all nonessential visits or instead switch to telemedicine. 146
Reasons beyond patient primacy likely motivated these providers to keep
offering such nonessential services amid a pandemic, such as physicians’ desire
to stay active and hopes that treatment protocols could be improved with
experience. Undoubtedly, economic considerations mattered as physician
practices faced significant financial losses from restricting services. Many of the
dermatology practices that remained open in this period were owned by private
141. See, e.g., Colo. Exec. Order 2020 009 (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.colorado.gov/governor/
sites/default/files/inline-files/D%202020%20009%20Ordering%20Cessation%20of%20All%20Elective
%20Surgeries_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/QLH6-NQHA]; Fla. Exec. Order No. 20-72 (Mar. 20, 2020),
https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/orders/2020/EO_20-72.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZW4CUTHH]; N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202.10 (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/default/
files/atoms/files/EO_202.10.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4SQ-WYFD].
142. See, e.g., Tara Bannow, UPMC Defends Decision To Continue with Some Elective Surgeries, MOD.
HEALTHCARE (Mar. 23, 2020, 4:43 PM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/providers/upmcdefends-decision-continue-some-elective-surgeries [https://perma.cc/52XY-UL8M].
143. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. For more about Tommy John surgery, see supra
note 1.
144. Henry Schulman, Top Tommy John Surgeon Defends Procedures Done During Coronavirus
Outbreak, S.F. CHRON., https://www.sfchronicle.com/giants/article/Top-Tommy-John-surgeondefends-procedures-done-15154721.php [https://perma.cc/F25L-RXFR (dark archive)] (Mar. 24, 2020,
4:46 PM); Los Angeles-Based Surgeon, Neal ElAttrache, MD Inducted as AOSSM President, AM.
ORTHOPAEDIC SOC’Y FOR SPORTS MED., https://www.sportsmed.org/aossmimis/Members/About/
Press_Releases/2018-Annual-Meeting/ElAttrache-Inducted-President.aspx [https://perma.cc/JS4XEP5X].
145. Schulman, supra note 144.
146. Katie Hafner, Many Dermatology Practices Stay Open, Ignoring Public Health Pleas, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/08/health/coronavirus-telemedicine-dermatology
.html [https://perma.cc/A8DL-QF97 (dark archive)].
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equity firms and faced pressures to generate practice revenues for investors. 147
But the physicians’ stated reasons, even if somewhat pretextual, for continuing
these services predictably referenced the patient-primacy directive and doing
what was best for their patients. Thus, it would be wrong to dismiss these
physicians as outliers. The more general and concerning point is that because
their public health responsibilities were so elusive, these physicians had
considerable discretion to downgrade public health concerns to an alarming
degree and faced no legal repercussions for doing so. Meanwhile, the “patients
first” rationale was so broad and seemingly beyond reproach that it could
obscure financial incentives and other questionable reasons at odds with
community health protection.
In urging physicians to delay less-essential procedures, professional
societies like the ACS issued thoughtful guidance about how surgeons should
prioritize services amid a pandemic. 148 However admirable, the ACS guidance
also reflected the still overwhelming influence of patient primacy. It argued that
“in periods of absolute scarcity of resources, public health ethics is the far more
responsible framework to adopt.” 149 This reasoning, unfortunately, ignores how
insufficient attention to public health effects can endanger the health of the
community even in mundane periods between declared emergencies. 150 If
physicians recognize and embrace public heath duties only when resources are
already significantly limited, it will likely be too little, too late.
Likewise, during the COVID-19 surge in December 2020, the National
Academy of Medicine (“NAM”), the AMA, and other provider organizations
called for regulatory support for shifting from typical delivery methods to
“crisis standards of care.” 151 They argued that because the pandemic had
severely strained resources, decisions needed to be made, such as canceling
nonemergency procedures, “to do the most good possible for the largest
number.” 152 Yet even with this call for a more express public health orientation
in practice standards, ensuring public health concerns command sufficient
physician attention still has proven difficult. This is due to the considerable
orbital pull of patient primacy. For example, NAM’s more specific guidance to
individual health care providers about incorporating crisis standards of care
expects, somewhat incongruously, that a physician account for community

147. Id.
148. COVID-19: Recommendations for Management of Elective Surgical Procedures, supra note 140.
149. Ethical Considerations, supra note 136.
150. See infra Sections III.B–E.
151. National Organizations Call for Action To Implement Crisis Standards of Care During COVID-19
Surge, NAT’L ACAD. MED. (Dec. 18, 2020), https://nam.edu/national-organizations-call-for-action-toimplement-crisis-standards-of-care-during-covid-19-surge/ [https://perma.cc/6LDC-MU9R].
152. Id.
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needs while also assuming a duty of care “for each patient, without bias, to the
best of your ability.” 153
At the other end of the spectrum, heightened attention to COVID-19
patients in certain instances may have unintentionally endangered community
health by glossing over negative spillover effects for the population. For
example, pediatric vaccination rates dangerously plummeted during the early
months of the pandemic, increasing community health risks due to potential
loss of herd immunity and transmission of vaccine-preventable diseases. 154
While this was in part due to parental fears about children acquiring COVID19 in doctors’ offices, health care providers’ reduced availability of well-child
visits likely also interfered with needed vaccination schedules. 155
Many public health interventions focus on prevention. Health researchers
worry that the delay of preventive care during the pandemic, such as
colonoscopies and mammograms, will end up posing serious long-term health
risks for the population, with potentially higher incidence rates of cancer and
other diseases. 156 Similarly, to preserve resources and manpower for COVID19 patients, several medical centers mandatorily suspended all their ongoing
clinical trials in the early months of the pandemic. 157 Such aggressive action
seems justified when focused on doing what is best for COVID-19 patients. But
it discounts resulting health risks for the population as “[o]ngoing trials have
potential to benefit millions of people with debilitating chronic diseases long
after the coronavirus pandemic has ended.” 158

153. DAN HANFLING, JOHN HICK, RICK HUNT & ERIC TONER, CRISIS STANDARDS OF
CARE: QUICK GUIDANCE FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS (2020), https://nam.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/12/csc-provider-guide_updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/DCJ5-GLBN] (emphasis
added).
154. Jeanne M. Santoli, Megan C. Lindley, Malini B. DeSilva, Elyse O. Kharbanda, Matthew F.
Daley, Lisa Galloway, Julianne Gee, Mick Glover, Ben Herring, Yoonjae Kang, Paul Lucas, Cameron
Noblit, Jeanne Tropper, Tara Vogt & Eric Weintraub, Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic on
Routine Pediatric Vaccine Ordering and Administration — United States, 2020, 69 MORBIDITY
& MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 591, 591 (2020); Melissa Jenco, AAP Urges Vaccination as Rates Drop Due
to COVID-19, AAP NEWS (May 8, 2020), https://www.aappublications.org/news/2020/05/08/
covid19vaccinations050820 [https://perma.cc/QM2N-BZ74].
155. Jan Hoffman, Vaccine Rates Drop Dangerously as Parents Avoid Doctor’s Visits, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/23/health/coronavirus-measles-vaccines.html [https://
perma.cc/6H7G-6M5K (dark archive)].
156. Sarah Kiff, Missed Vaccines, Skipped Colonoscopies: Preventative Care Plummets, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/11/upshot/pandemic-decline-preventivecare.html [https://perma.cc/M5W6-EK8W (dark archive)].
157. Mary M. McDermott & Anne B. Newman, Preserving Clinical Trial Integrity During the
Coronavirus Pandemic, 323 JAMA 2135, 2135 (2020).
158. Id.
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Antibiotic Prescribing

The “antibiotic paradox” means that prescribing an antibiotic can have
dual, contradictory effects—combatting targeted illness for one patient while
also increasing resistant bacterial strains in the community and jeopardizing the
medication’s effectiveness when used again for future health threats. 159 Thus,
for public health reasons, physicians must sometimes conserve use of antibiotics
when the medication might offer only marginal benefit to the patient, because
of the larger concern of minimizing bacterial resistance.
Yet physicians have performed poorly as prudent stewards of the antibiotic
supply. 160 Studies suggest that physicians frequently engage in inappropriate
antibiotic prescribing, over ordering the drugs by as much as fifty percent and
contributing to resistance pressures. 161 Inappropriate prescribing includes not
only ordering antibiotics for viral infections, for which the drugs are ineffective,
but also prescribing the medications at incorrect dosage and intervals, failure to
monitor patients’ use of the medications after ordered, and using broadspectrum agents when narrower-spectrum drugs would suffice. 162
Taking on the necessary gatekeeping responsibilities runs counter to
physicians’ preferred and seemingly simpler role as zealous healers for
individual patients. Indeed, evidence suggests that physicians privilege their
patients and do not attach sufficient weight to public health concerns when
deciding on a course of antibiotic therapy. 163 In a study of attitudes about
antibiotic prescribing, researchers asked a national sample of physicians to opine
about which types of drugs they would order for a sample patient with

159. STUART B. LEVY, THE ANTIBIOTIC PARADOX: HOW THE MISUSE OF ANTIBIOTICS
DESTROYS THEIR CURATIVE POWERS, at XII–XIV (2002).
160. See generally Richard S. Saver, In Tepid Defense of Population Health: Physicians and Antibiotic
Resistance, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 431 (2008) (discussing the physicians’ poor track record, and limited
incentives, in conserving antibiotics).
161. Katherine E. Fleming-Dutra, Adam L. Hersh, Daniel J. Shapiro, Monina Bartoces, Eva A.
Enns, Thomas M. File Jr., Jonathan A. Finkelstein, Jeffrey S. Gerber, David Y. Hyun, Jeffrey A.
Linder, Ruth Lynfield, David J. Margolis, Larissa S. May, Daniel Merenstein, Joshua P. Metlay, Jason
G. Newland, Jay F. Piccirillo, Rebecca M. Roberts, Guillermo V. Sanchez, Katie J. Suda, Ann Thomas,
Teri Moser Woo, Rachel M. Zetts & Lauri A. Hicks, Prevalence of Inappropriate Antibiotic Prescriptions
Among US Ambulatory Care Visits, 2010-2011, 315 JAMA 1864, 1869 (2016).
162. Labeling Requirements for Systematic Antibacterial Drug Products Intended for Human
Use, 68 Fed. Reg. 6062, 6068 (Feb. 6, 2003) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 201); cf. Ross J. Simpson, Jr.,
Challenges for Improving Medication Adherences, 296 JAMA 2614, 2614 (2006) (discussing how patient
education and structural support could help improve medication adherence in elderly patients).
163. See, e.g., Bernadine Dao, Thomas Douglas, Alberto Giubilini, Julian Savulescu, Michael
Selgalid & Nadira S. Faber, Impartiality and Infectious Disease: Prioritizing Individuals Versus the Collective
in Antibiotic Prescription, 10 AJOB EMPIRICAL BIOETHICS 63, 64 (2019) (“There is evidence that
doctors frequently prioritize individual patient health over public health when deciding whether to
prescribe antibiotics . . . .”).
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community-acquired pneumonia. 164 The physicians were more likely to order
new broad-spectrum drugs even though infectious disease guidelines
recommended use of other antibiotics to minimize resistance pressures. 165 Even
more revealing, when asked to rank which factors (such as side effects, efficacy,
and cost to patient) mattered most in their decision-making, most physicians
placed the societal risk of antibiotic resistance at or very near the bottom. 166 The
study authors concluded from the data that whenever faced with the tension
between following the interests of the individual patient and population health
concerns about antibiotic resistance, physicians discounted the public
interest. 167
Antibiotic resistance dramatically demonstrates the fallacy of the
medicine/public health divide. Decisions within the confines of an individual
doctor-patient relationship cannot be neatly sequestered from the health of the
population. Indeed, antibiotic resistance problems usually start in local regions,
such as a single hospital or clinic through institution-acquired infection or in
small geographic areas, and then spread outward. In these localized
environments the actions of just a small number of physicians with sufficient
patient load can introduce strong selection pressures for resistant disease strains
that affect the entire community. 168
Law’s patient-primacy directive seems to discourage physicians from
engaging in antibiotic conservation. First, consider informed consent. Informed
consent doctrine generally requires a physician to advise the patient about a
proposed treatment’s material risks. But the law is so patient focused that courts
conceive of these risks as the harms that may materialize for the patient, not the
populace. 169 A physician is under no legal obligation to inform the patient about
the resistance risks and dangers to community health from inappropriate
antibiotic use, such as if the patient fails to adhere to the medication schedule. 170
Second, fiduciary duty obligations also may be at odds with prudent
antibiotic stewardship. For example, antibiotic resistance concerns would
counsel physicians to restrict antibiotic use to only high-value uses for their
patients and to avoid initially prescribing where the patient only might benefit

164. Joshua P. Metlay, Judy A. Shea, Linda B. Crossette & David A. Asch, Tensions in Antibiotics
Prescribing: Pitting Social Concerns Against the Interest of Individual Patients, 17 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED.
87, 87 (2002).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See id.
168. INST. OF MED., ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE: ISSUES AND OPTIONS 37 (Polly F.
Harrison & Joshua Lederberg eds., 1998); David M. Livermore, Bacterial Resistance: Origins,
Epidemiology, and Impact, 36 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES S11, S15–S16 (2003).
169. See Wendy E. Parmet, Unprepared: Why Health Law Fails To Prepare Us for a Pandemic, 2 J.
HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 157, 174 (2006).
170. Id. at 176.
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and where the degree of benefit is likely small. 171 Another antibiotic
conservation technique is to cycle medications, deliberately altering and
rotating different classes of antibiotics in episodes of care for particular
patients. 172 But fiduciary duty problems can arguably arise if a physician follows
these strategies. A physician is not clearly acting as a fiduciary in advancing the
patient’s interests above all others if the physician restricts the patient from
even marginal benefits of using a medication. Likewise, a physician who cycles
medications may override a patient’s legitimate preferences for one drug over
another, given differences in side effects and costs among other reasons.
C.

Disease Reporting

Disease surveillance, a fundamental public health activity, provides the
critical foundation for contact tracing, resource mobilization, education,
planning, and other control and prevention measures. 173 As part of disease
surveillance, every state has statutory and regulatory requirements that
physicians, clinical laboratories, and select other health care providers report
various infectious disease cases to public health authorities. 174 Penalties for
noncompliance are usually modest. As an illustration, Florida’s statute provides
for misdemeanor civil fines up to $500. 175 A few disease-reporting statutes also
impose potential criminal sanctions, but the penalties are rarely applied. 176 As
previously noted, a few states’ medical practice acts expressly condition
physician licensure on compliance with disease-reporting obligations, although
actual licensure discipline for nonreporting seems quite rare. 177 Finally, the
existence of a disease-reporting statute may be used to establish a duty and

171. See Ben Parsonage, Philip K. Hagglund, Lloyd Keogh, Nick Wheelhouse, Richard E. Brown
& Stephanie J. Dancer, Control of Antimicrobial Resistance Requires an Ethical Approach, 8 FRONTIERS
MICROBIOLOGY 1, 2 (2017) (discussing the dilemma in helping patients and the public).
172. See Geraldine Mary Conlon-Bingham, Mamoon Aldeyab, Michael Scott, Mary Patricia
Kearney, David Farren, Fiona Gilmore & James McElnay, Effects of Antibiotic Cycling Policy on Incidence
of Healthcare-Associated MRSA and Clostridioides difficile Infection in Secondary Healthcare Settings, 25
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE 52, 52 (2019).
173. Maxim Gakh, Brian Labus & Brittany Walker, Characteristics of Laws Requiring Physicians To
Report Patient Information for Public Health Surveillance: Notable Patterns from a Nevada Case Study, 43 J.
CMTY. HEALTH 328, 328 (2018) (“Reporting information for public health surveillance purposes is
imperative for public health practice, including disease and injury investigation, pattern identification,
treatment, and control.”).
174. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-135 (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2021-4 of the 2021 Reg.
Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.); 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 41A.0101 (Westlaw through Feb. 10, 2021).
175. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 64D-3.029, -3.047 (LEXIS through Mar. 31, 2021).
176. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 101: A CDC
FOUNDATIONAL COURSE FOR PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTITIONERS 18, https://www.cdc.gov/phlp/
docs/phl101/PHL101-Unit-5-16Jan09-Secure.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WNH-ZSNR].
177. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-21 (Westlaw through L.2021, c. 32 and J.R. No. 1); N.J.
ADMIN. CODE § 13:35-6.24 (LEXIS through the New Jersey Reg., Vol. 53 No. 7, Apr. 5, 2021); see
also supra text accompanying note 74.
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define the standard of care in private common-law claims against physicians for
third-party exposure to infectious disease. 178
Despite the clear statutory mandates, community physicians show little
enthusiasm for following disease-reporting requirements. Compliance has been
characterized as “inconsistent, infrequent, and delayed.” 179 Physicians have
historically performed poorly as mandatory reporters. 180 Surveys show
compliance rates ranging from about forty to fifty-six percent for common
sexually transmitted diseases such as chlamydia and AIDS. 181
Physician noncompliance may, at first blush, seem largely a problem of lax
enforcement and insufficient deterrence incentives. As noted, the direct and
indirect sanctions for noncompliance are limited and rarely applied. In this
respect, physicians’ disease-reporting duties follow the elusivity pattern. The
legal requirements are more law-in-books than law-in-action: acknowledged but
not really commanding influence. But the noncompliance problems indicate
deeper problems of physician disengagement. After all, individuals adhere to
mandates and statutory obligations, even when infrequently enforced, when
they have more intrinsic motivations for compliance. 182 With regard to disease
reporting, however, physicians apparently have limited intrinsic motivation,
reflecting the underweighting of public health considerations. The stated
reasons for physician noncompliance have varied over time, including concerns
of patient confidentiality, technical questions about the utility of the case
reports themselves, and confusion as to which diseases are reportable. 183
Additional factors frequently mentioned include the burdensome time and
resource commitment, insufficient rewards for reporting, and physicians relying

178. See supra Section I.B.1.
179. Mary-Margaret A. Fill, Rendi Murphree & April C. Pettit, Healthcare Provider Knowledge and
Attitudes Regarding Reporting Diseases and Events to Public Health Authorities in Tennessee, 23 J. PUB.
HEALTH MGMT. PRAC. 581, 582 (2017).
180. Rene Bowser & Lawrence O. Gostin, Managed Care and the Health of a Nation, 72 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1209, 1259 (1999); see Timothy J. Doyle, M. Kathleen Glynn & Samuel L. Groseclose,
Completeness of Notifiable Infectious Disease Reporting in the United States: An Analytical Literature Review,
155 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 866, 871 (2002) (finding that reporting completeness for diseases other
than AIDS, sexually transmitted diseases, and tuberculosis is only forty-nine percent).
181. See Janet S. St. Lawrence, Daniel E. Montaño, Danuta Kasprzyk, William R. Phillips, Keira
Armstrong & Jami S. Leichliter, STD Screening, Testing, Case Reporting, and Clinical and Partner
Notification Practices: A National Survey of US Physicians, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1784, 1787 (2002)
(indicating that only slightly more than half of physicians make required case reports for sexually
transmitted diseases such as syphilis and HIV and that many physicians prefer to rely on their patients
for partner notification).
182. See, e.g., Kristen Underhill, When Extrinsic Incentives Displace Intrinsic Motivation: Designing
Legal Carrots and Sticks To Confront the Challenge of Motivational Crowding-Out, 33 YALE J. REGUL. 213,
219–20 (2016).
183. Fox, supra note 114, at 14; Gakh et al., supra note 173, at 329.
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on other health care team members—particularly clinical laboratories
conducting disease testing—to make the required reports. 184
Some of these reasons seem pretextual. For example, complaints about
breaching confidentiality are likely overstated as public health officers have
historically treated physician case reports as strictly confidential. 185 Further, the
federal medical privacy law, the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), 186 has a broad public health exception that
permits provider reporting of infectious disease incidents to public health
agencies. 187
Other reasons seem evasive. Physicians’ inclination to delegate reporting
responsibilities to clinical laboratories, for example, neglects the importance of
physician involvement. Many disease-reporting statutes apply broadly to
include instances of suspected disease incidents, not just confirmed cases
resulting from laboratory tests. 188 Physicians’ clinical impressions matter greatly
when classifying an individual as a suspected case. Further, certain diseases and
syndromes like pediatric influenza deaths do not have confirmatory laboratory
tests available at all, so effective public health surveillance depends largely on
physicians’ clinical judgment to identify these incidents. 189
The varied reasons offered for physician noncompliance obscure a more
fundamental problem: many physicians perceive their core professional
obligations as largely distinct from basic public health practices. Indeed, public
health practitioners and private physicians view disease reporting through very
different perspectives. Public health practitioners envision effective disease
reporting as instrumental for necessary surveillance. They consider
participation in disease reporting as part of each provider’s shared
accountability for the health of the populace. But private physicians have been
far more wary of disease reporting, in particular how it may intrude upon
individual treatment relationships: “Public health professionals see their first
duty as protecting the population, and they justify reporting by invoking
science and the ethics of collective responsibility. Private physicians, on the
other hand, see their first duty as safeguarding patients; they accord a higher
priority to the sanctity of their therapeutic relationships.” 190
A public health-surveillance system can only be as good as the information
inputted. The long-standing problem of physician noncompliance with disease184. Fill et al., supra note 179, at 582–83; Gakh et al., supra note 173, at 329.
185. Fox, supra note 114, at 14.
186. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29,
and 42 U.S.C.).
187. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b) (2019).
188. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-135 (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2021-4 of the 2021 Reg.
Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.).
189. Fill et al., supra note 179, at 587.
190. GOSTIN, supra note 10, at 297.
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reporting laws, resulting in part from privileging relationships with patients and
physician indifference to weak statutory reporting duties, dangerously elevates
health risks for the community.
D.

The Opioid Epidemic

The alarming rates of opioid abuse and overdoses present a severe public
health threat. Many root causes have been identified, including aggressive
marketing and financial incentives offered to prescribers by pharmaceutical
companies; flawed reimbursement programs that encourage prescribing-based
interventions to manage chronic pain compared to safer behavioral alternatives;
accreditations standards for health care institutions that stressed pain
management obligations; a fragmented health care system that fails to track
patients’ prescriptions from a holistic perspective; and inadequate training of
physicians in recognizing and treating addiction. 191 Because the opioid crisis
involves many actors and moving parts, it defies easy narratives of
accountability and blame.
But while many complex factors are in play, lurking less visibly beneath
the surface is a familiar pattern: physicians’ underweighting of the public health
implications of their treatment decisions. Certain physicians are easy targets for
disapproval. Physicians who prescribed large amounts of opioids, egregiously
breaching standards of care, 192 as well as physicians who engaged in “pill mill”
schemes to exchange prescriptions for cash, 193 certainly contributed to the
current opioid crisis. But a fair number of physicians engaged in problematic
opioid prescribing for less nefarious reasons. Many community physicians were
swept up into, and exacerbated the opioid epidemic because of, their blinkered
devotion to their individual patients.
First, physicians prescribed opioids in patterns and amounts that
foreseeably permitted diversion of the medications to non-patients, fueling
negative downstream effects and potential black-market dangers for the
community. As Dr. Anna Lembke describes in The New England Journal of
Medicine, one puzzle of the opioid crisis is that “[i]n many instances, doctors are
191. See, e.g., Ronald Hirsch, The Opioid Epidemic: It’s Time To Place Blame Where It Belongs,
114 MO. MED. 82, 83–84 (2017); Mark A. Rothstein, Ethical Responsibilities of Physicians in the
Opioid Crisis, 45 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 682, 683 (2017); Mukul Mehra, Why Opioid Addiction Will
Persist Until Physicians Have a Panoramic View of Opioid Exposure, HEALTH AFFS. (Oct. 4,
2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180928.934819/full/ [https://perma.cc/L7XY
-3WY5].
192. See, e.g., Tony Messenger, Messenger: St. Louis Jury Verdict Sends $17.6 Million Message in
Opioid Abuse Verdict, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (June 28, 2016), https://www.stltoday.com/
news/local/columns/tony-messenger/messenger-st-louis-jury-sends-17-6-million-message-in-opioidabuse-verdict/article_b7628f83-0e94-5bc7-a2a8-38a12ab6d7d6.html [https://perma.cc/B3GP-MXTX]
(discussing a physician receiving a verdict against him for prescribing opioids far above those
recommended by the CDC).
193. Hirsch, supra note 191, at 82.
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fully aware that their patients are abusing these medications or diverting them
to others for nonmedical use, but they prescribe them anyway.” 194 In fact, the
common tendency for physicians was to prescribe thirty to ninety opioid pills
per prescription even though much smaller amounts would have been medically
indicated and “[i]t is the leftover pills that sit forgotten in the medicine cabinet
which often lead to trouble, stolen by a relative or visitor and abused.” 195
Physicians could rationalize such excessive prescribing for patient convenience,
avoiding patient hassle in pursuing multiple refills. Further, physicians most
interested in securing their patients’ satisfaction above all else could be tempted
to “just sign another prescription” for a patient rather than take on the more
difficult task of confronting patients with suspected abuse problems or
gatekeeping access to opioids. 196
It is worth repeating that a fair number of physicians contributed to the
opioid crisis inadvertently, but precisely because they focused so much on
patient welfare. Following the newer professional guidance to take pain
seriously, these physicians desired to be “good” doctors in providing relief for
their patients. 197 The imperative “we don’t want our patients to experience
pain” commanded so much physician attention that it obscured the negative
downstream public health effects of long-term opioid prescribing. 198 Believing
their first priority was to their patients, and that “all suffering is avoidable,”
these well-meaning physicians allowed “the patient’s subjective experience of
pain . . . [to] take[] precedence over other, potentially competing,
considerations.” 199 Competing considerations that were sublimated certainly
include community health risks from widespread, chronic use of opioids, such
as increased rates of addiction and blood-borne, bacterial, and sexually
transmitted infections. 200
Illustrating the elusivity problem regarding physicians’ public health
duties, some scholars writing about the opioid crisis have aggressively advanced
a message of patient primacy that bafflingly eclipses community health
concerns. Worried about denying patients’ access to needed pain relief, these
scholars argue that in prescribing opioids, “harm to society should weigh little, if
194. Anna Lembke, Why Doctors Prescribe Opioids to Known Opioid Abusers, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1580, 1580 (2012).
195. Hirsch, supra note 191, at 82.
196. Nicole Gastala, Denial: The Greatest Barrier to the Opioid Epidemic, 15 ANNALS FAM. MED.
372, 373 (2017).
197. Vernon Williams, Are Doctors To Blame for Prescription Opioid Overuse in America?, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP. (Mar. 25, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://health.usnews.com/health-care/for-better/
articles/are-doctors-to-blame-for-prescription-opioid-overuse-in-america
[https://perma.cc/XF93E8FL (staff-uploaded archive)].
198. Hirsch, supra note 191, at 82.
199. Lembke, supra note 194, at 1580.
200. See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE OPIOID USE
DISORDER AND INFECTIOUS DISEASE SERVICES 1 (2020).
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at all, in the treating physician’s assessment.” 201 Such commentary reinforces
the notion that physicians’ duties are solely patient directed, while glossing over
their public health responsibilities.
To be clear, this is not a general critique of the medical movement to treat
pain seriously. In earlier eras, physicians were rightly criticized for being
unconcerned with patient discomfort and for viewing pain relief as “nobody’s
job.” 202 And physicians otherwise inclined to treat pain seriously were wary of
prescribing opioids because of fear of regulatory scrutiny and professional
disciplinary action for ordering controlled substances. 203 Instead, this is just
recognition that however welcome the new push to relieve patient suffering, it
also raised countervailing implications for public health. Rather than delicately
balancing these community concerns against patient need, individual clinicians
seem to have given short shrift to public health.
Particularly revealing is how physicians have reacted to prescription drug
monitoring programs (“PDMPs”). PDMPs, electronic databases that track
prescriptions of certain medications and often require physician query before
prescribing, have been implemented by law in many states as a means to combat
the opioid epidemic. 204 Yet this form of public health regulation has engendered
physician resistance. 205 Part of the opposition stems from concerns that PDMPs
limit physician autonomy, expose physicians to greater liability, and may open
the door to displacing professional self-regulation with greater state control of
medical practice. Debates about PDMPs, however, invariably include claims
that this form of regulation interferes with the doctor-patient relationship.
Under this view, PDMPs impede physicians’ ability to provide individually
tailored care by limiting treatment choices. 206 This illustrates why the patientprimacy directive exerts such strength and attraction for physicians compared
to public health obligations. Patient welfare becomes deeply intertwined with,
and may even provide appealing cover for, underlying anxieties about physician
autonomy. In making claims about putting patients first and protecting the

201. Kate M. Nicholson & Deborah Hellman, Opioid Prescribing and the Ethical Duty To Do No
Harm, 46 AM. J.L. & MED. 297, 299 (2020) (emphasis added).
202. DAVID W. BAKER, JOINT COMM’N, THE JOINT COMMISSION’S PAIN STANDARDS:
ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION 2 (2017), https://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/6/Pain_Std_History
_Web_Version_05122017.pdf [https://perma.cc/KV2P-LJGY].
203. Diane E. Hoffmann & Anita J. Tarzian, Achieving the Right Balance in Oversight of Physician
Opioid Prescribing for Pain: The Role of State Medical Boards, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 21, 21 (2003).
204. See Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdmp/states.html [https://perma.cc/86E7-EHVN].
205. See Joanne Finnegan, Why Many Doctors Oppose Mandatory Use of PDMPs, FIERCE HEALTH
CARE (Jan. 17, 2017, 10:39 AM), https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/practices/reasons-why-manydoctors-oppose-mandatory-use-pdmps [https://perma.cc/8QM8-C7CU].
206. Mark Barnes, John Giampa & Minal Caron, Opioid Prescribing and Physician Autonomy: A
Quality of Care Perspective, 15 HSS J. 20, 21 (2019).
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doctor-patient relationship from outside interference, physicians can resist laws
that do not defer to their wide exercise of professional authority and judgment.
Further, public health laws may be more readily discounted by physicians
because of their seeming inapplicability to patient circumstances. Many public
health regulatory interventions, like PDMPs, address population-wide effects
and therefore rely on uniform, standardized approaches. Physicians tend to be
indifferent to or even suspicious of this form of regulation because they remain
focused on individual patient health and “[a]pparent solutions of general
applicability may result in individual cases of suboptimal medical care.” 207
While public health concerns in the initial stages of the opioid epidemic
were largely about overprescribing, now there is danger of the pendulum
swinging back yet again. Some physicians are creating new public health
problems because of insufficient opioid prescribing. Because of increased scrutiny
arising from the opioid crisis, these physicians have dramatically cut down on
their use of opioids. Yet they are not necessarily providing adequate alternative
pain-relief interventions for their chronic pain patients, while other physicians
have abruptly stopped treating any patients suspected of abusing opioids. 208
This imperils not only the health of patients who may be going through
withdrawal, but also the health of the community because of the downstream
effects of such drastic limitations of care, including increased risk of infectious
disease and other health-harming behavior. This is because “[l]eft to their own
devices, many of these individuals begin using heroin or illegally obtained
synthetic opioids, become infected with hepatis B or C or HIV, or suffer the
catastrophic effects of an overdose.” 209
Physicians who engage in insufficient prescribing are not exactly
prioritizing their patients’ needs, so in this context it is not yet again the patientprimacy directive exerting dominance. But neither are these physicians
optimally protecting the health of the community. It seems that private
physicians’ public health duties and internalization of a public health-oriented
mission are so elusive and ephemeral that even when consciously turning away
from the end goal of relieving suffering of individual patients, these physicians
remain largely inattentive to the full impact of their treatment-withdrawal
decisions on public health.
E.

Gun Violence

The alarmingly high number of individuals killed or injured each year as
the result of firearms has led public health officials to identify gun violence as

207. Id. at 22.
208. Williams, supra note 197.
209. Rothstein, supra note 191, at 683.
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a public health crisis. 210 Advocates believe a public health approach is warranted
not only because of the aggregate numbers of death and injuries, but also
because epidemiological analysis suggests gun violence may share features with
communicable diseases; exposure to gun violence can predict other incidents,
and gun violence often diffuses like a contagion through connected social
networks. 211 Physicians also are being asked to step up. Various medical groups
including the AMA and the American Academy of Pediatrics have issued policy
statements calling for greater physician involvement in combating gun
violence. 212
Physician engagement can take various forms. For example, physicians can
counsel patients about the risks of guns in the home and recommend safe storage
practices. Although there is a dearth of well-designed studies, research suggests
physician counseling in this manner may mitigate injury risk. 213 Physicians can
also conduct screenings and implement interventions for risk of suicide, given
the high correlation between gun ownership and deaths involving suicide. 214
Physician screening and intervention can also reduce harms for additional highrisk populations when guns are in the home, including children, patients with
dementia, patients experiencing alcohol abuse, and domestic violence victims. 215
Although well positioned to address gun injury, physicians “ask
infrequently about firearms and counsel poorly, if at all, although they are aware
that the high lethality of firearms makes prevention efforts particularly
important.” 216 A number of barriers have been identified. Some physicians
210. Gun Violence, AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, https://www.apha.org/topics-and-issues/gunviolence [https://perma.cc/XJ9T-V2KT].
211. See, e.g., Ben Green, Thibaut Horel & Andrew V. Papachristos, Modeling Contagion Through
Social Networks To Explain and Predict Gunshot Violence in Chicago, 2006 to 2014, 177 JAMA INTERNAL
MED. 326, 327 (2017).
212. AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, Firearm-Related Injuries Affecting the Pediatric Population,
130 PEDIATRICS e1416, e1421 (2012); Firearm Safety Counseling in Physician-Led Health Care Teams:
H-145.976, AM. MED. ASS’N (2018), https://policysearch.ama-assn.org/policyfinder/detail/H145.976%20?uri=%2FAMADoc%2FHOD.xml-0-533.xml [https://perma.cc/DM6E-4KRV].
213. Brendan Parent, Physicians Asking Patients About Guns: Promoting Patient Safety, Respecting
Patient Rights, 31 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1242, 1242 (2016).
214. Howard Bauchner, Frederick P. Rivara, Robert O. Bonow, Neil M. Bressler, Mary L. (Nora)
Disis, Stephan Heckers, S. Andrew Josephson, Melina R. Kibbe, Jay F. Piccirillo, Rita F. Redberg,
John S. Rhee & June K. Robinson, Death by Gun Violence—A Public Health Crisis, 318 JAMA 1763, 1763
(2017); David M. Studdert, Yifan Zhang, Sonja A. Swanson, Lea Prince, Jonathan A. Rodden, Erin E.
Holsinger, Matthew J. Spittal, Garen J. Wintemute & Matthew Miller, Handgun Ownership and Suicide
in California, 382 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2220, 2220 (2020).
215. Marian E. Betz & Garen J. Wintemute, Physician Counseling on Firearm Safety: A New Kind
of Cultural Competence, 314 JAMA 449, 449 (2015); Melissa Bailey, Doctors Need To Talk to
Families About Guns and Dementia, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/09/
well/live/doctors-need-to-talk-to-families-about-guns-and-dementia.html [https://perma.cc/NHW3TWGQ (dark archive)].
216. Garen J. Wintemute, Marian E. Betz & Megan L. Ranney, Yes, You Can: Physicians, Patients,
and Firearms, 165 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 205, 205 (2016).
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report uncertainty about how to communicate with patients about guns and
concerns that interventions will be ineffective. 217 Also, apprehension of legal
liability has taken on outsized importance. Florida enacted a highly publicized
“gag” law that sought to restrict physicians’ ability to ask patients about the
presence of guns in their homes and to document this information in medical
records. 218 Physicians nationwide, following coverage of the Florida
controversy, likely perceived that laws prevented them from talking to their
patients about gun ownership and risk of injury.
Yet legal restrictions cannot fully explain the significant physician
hesitancy. First, perceptions about significant legal impediments are likely
mistaken. After lengthy litigation, and multiple appeals, the Eleventh Circuit
held that major provisions of the Florida statute violated the First Amendment
rights of physicians and struck down key provisions of the law. 219 Also, the
highly publicized gag law, even before being struck down, only applied in
Florida, and posed no restrictions to physicians in other states. Moreover, even
in Florida, physicians were rarely asking patients about guns before the
enactment of the gag law, so the concerns with legal liability seem somewhat of
a red herring. 220
Clearly patient primacy is also a significant part of the picture. Some
physicians report hesitancy to discuss guns with patients because they worry
that such inquiries damage the doctor-patient relationship. 221 Other physicians
indicate concern that such discussions may infringe on their patients’ privacy. 222
Such heightened concern for patient sensitivity and privacy seems oddly
misplaced however. As noted, no law generally restricts physicians from asking
about gun ownership and the information once gathered would be subject to
usual doctor-patient confidentiality restrictions. In addition, patients are not
compelled to answer the physician’s questions. More importantly, physicians
routinely ask patients about quite personal and sensitive information, including
drug and alcohol use, sexual activity, and mental health. 223
In addition, some physicians perceive combatting gun violence as beyond
their professional scope of practice, further illustrating the elusiveness of their

217. Id. at 208.
218. Act of June 2, 2011, ch. 2011-112, 2011 Fla. Laws 1776 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT.
§§ 381.026, 395.1055, 456.072, 790.338 (Westlaw through chs. from the 2020 2d Reg. Sess. of the 26th
Legis.)).
219. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1301 (11th Cir. 2017).
220. Id. at 1312 (“Here the Florida Legislature, in enacting [the firearm gag law], relied on six
anecdotes and nothing more. There was no other evidence, empirical or otherwise, presented to or cited
by the Florida Legislature.”).
221. Wintemute et al., supra note 216, at 208.
222. Parent, supra note 213, at 1243.
223. Id.
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public health obligations. 224 As gun ownership is a highly charged issue in the
United States, both culturally and politically, it should not surprise that without
clearer guidance about their professional role, physicians would opt to avoid the
issue of gun-violence prevention altogether. The National Rifle Association
(“NRA”) has also been very adept in pushing the “scope of practice” angle. The
NRA has publicly warned physicians to “stay in their lane.” 225 The rationale
apparently is that gun violence is not sufficiently connected to actual medical
care and is therefore inappropriate for physician involvement. 226
It is unclear why gun-violence prevention should seem so disconnected
from responsible physician engagement. Physicians have direct expertise with
the medical care needs that result from gun violence. They are also well
positioned to identify and screen for high-risk populations, such as patients with
dementia or suicidal ideation. 227 Moreover, physicians have not always limited
themselves to treating existing illness. They have long adopted counseling and
safety-education roles regarding external threats, conditions, and behaviors that
can be potentially health harming. For example, pediatricians routinely inquire
about use of car seats for their young patients 228 and physicians screen for
possible exposure to lead poisoning from paint and other sources in the home. 229
Gun-violence prevention, therefore, seems equally within physicians’ scope of
practice. Yet uneasiness about taking on uncertain public health obligations,
along with the default privileging of patient interests over community health
protection, have contributed to physician hesitancy.
IV. RECALIBRATING PHYSICIANS’ PUBLIC HEALTH DUTIES
Identifying the problematic risk externalization associated with
physicians’ elusive public health duties does not answer what to do about it. A
legal shift in physicians’ duties raises difficult challenges, both pragmatic and
doctrinal. This part evaluates the potential obstacles to making physicians’
public health duties more robust and cognizable under law. To address the
insufficient theorization underlying physicians’ community health obligations,

224. Wintemute et al., supra note 216, at 208.
225. Matthew Haag, Doctors Revolt After N.R.A. Tells Them To ‘Stay in Their Lane’ on Gun
Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/13/us/nra-stay-in-your-lanedoctors.html [https://perma.cc/Z5J4-2MD5 (dark archive)].
226. See, e.g., Report Suggests that Doctors Are a Leading Cause of Death, NRA-ILA (May 13, 2016),
https://www.nraila.org/articles/20160513/report-suggests-that-doctors-are-a-leading-cause-of-death
[https://perma.cc/4JWY-BZL6].
227. Darren Taichman, Sue S. Bornstein & Christine Liane, Firearm Injury Prevention: AFFIRMing
that Doctors Are in Our Lane, 169 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 885, 885 (2018).
228. See Dennis R. Durbin, Benjamin D. Hoffman & Council on Injury, Violence, & Poison
Prevention, Child Passenger Safety, 142 PEDIATRICS 1, 4 (2018).
229. See Crista Warniment, Katrina Tsang & Sim S. Galazka, Lead Poisoning in Children, 81 AM.
FAM. PHYSICIAN 751, 751 (2010).
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this part also explores various justifications for recalibrating physicians’ public
health duties including, most importantly, role indispensability.
A.

Challenges in Making Public Health Duties More Robust

Strengthening physicians’ public health duties raises many potential
difficulties, including unlimited liability, common law’s traditional reluctance
to impose affirmative duties on nonfeasant parties, and the undermining of
physicians’ fiduciary obligations.
1. Too Many Plaintiffs/Liability Without Limits
If law imposes stronger public health responsibilities, does this mean that
each physician owes to every member of the public an actionable duty to
safeguard community health? This shift might counterproductively move from
limited accountability to an even worse state of overdeterrence. Rather than
optimally incentivizing private physicians to take public health action, the
heightened liability exposure could lead to distorted decision-making and severe
limitations in the supply of physician services.
This concern with obligations to too many plaintiffs runs through the
infectious disease case law. Courts have been very reluctant to extend
physicians’ duties to foreseeable third parties harmed by their patients’
infectious diseases. The fear is that once the physician’s duty extends beyond
the doctor-patient relationship, no principled method exists for demarcating
where the physician’s duty ends. For example, in McNulty v. City of New York, 230
physicians treated a patient with infectious meningitis. A friend of the patient
also contracted the disease. The friend alleged that the physicians breached a
duty in failing to advise that she might need treatment after being in close
contact with the patient. 231 The court held that the physicians owed no
actionable duty to the friend. As the court observed, “[U]nderlying this
reluctance [to extend duty to non-patients] is the danger that a recognition of a
duty would render doctors liable to a prohibitive number of possible
plaintiffs.” 232 While acknowledging that it might be wise public policy for
physicians to advise non-patients of their health risks from possible exposure,
the court concluded that enlarging physicians’ duties this broadly would go
against the strong principle of “limit[ing] the legal consequences of wrongs to a
controllable degree.” 233
While a challenge, the “too many plaintiffs” problem is not necessarily
insurmountable. In other contexts, courts have deployed various doctrinal rules,
230.
231.
232.
233.
1969)).

792 N.E.2d 162 (N.Y. 2003).
Id. at 163.
Id. at 166.
Id. at 167 (Kaye, J., concurring) (quoting Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424 (N.Y.
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such as privity, to fix the “orbit of duty . . . to protect against crushing exposure
to liability.” 234 Courts in public health disputes likewise could use line-drawing
rules. For example, a physician’s public health duties could be held to run only
to particularly foreseeable parties connected to either the physician or patient
in a manner that goes beyond mere exposure to the risk emanating from the
doctor-patient relationship. These connections could be close familial, social, or
business relationships with either the physician or patient. Geographic
proximity with the physician or patient could also be considered as a dutydefining factor, which would serve as a proxy for local community ties. Thus,
the physician might owe a duty to the patient’s close family, friends, coworkers,
and immediate neighbors, but not necessarily to other foreseeable third parties,
such as copatrons of the same retail establishments, who end up exposed to the
patient’s health risk. Such distinctions admittedly run the risk of arbitrariness,
but no more so than other line drawing courts have regularly engaged in to set
limits on otherwise unbounded duty. 235
If such line drawing does become too arbitrary, or fails to limit physicians’
liability exposure to feasible levels, courts and/or legislators could instead
establish that the physician’s breach of public health duties is not actionable by
individual community members, but only by intermediaries and proxies for the
public, such as state attorneys general or state medical boards. 236 Under this
approach, while physicians would be recognized as having more robust legal
duties to protect community health, breaches of such duties would be enforced
in the public’s interest only by such appropriate intermediaries, who would be
expected to act as prudent representatives and remain sensitive to
overburdening ordinary physicians with inordinate liability exposure.
Moreover, undue liability exposure associated with more robust public
health obligations may be overstated. At least for common-law claims,
individual members of the public bringing actions as plaintiffs would still have
the burdens of proof and persuasion concerning causation. For many public
health hazards, such as incidents of gun violence or infectious disease outbreak,
it becomes daunting to prove causation with a clear enough nexus between the
physician’s conduct and the public health risks that injure the individual third
party. Inevitable causation complications arise, including the ways the risk
emanating from the doctor-patient relationship intermingle with other risks in
234. Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34, 36 (N.Y. 1985) (citations omitted).
235. See, e.g., id. (using privity as a duty-limiting factor); Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 528 (N.J.
1980) (holding that duty owed to bystanders experiencing emotional harm due to defendant’s
negligence is limited to when bystanders contemporaneously observe the death or serious injury of an
intimately related family member at the scene and go on to experience severe emotional distress).
236. Relatedly, in several jurisdictions the state attorney general acts as proxy for and represents
the public’s interest in reviewing transactions involving acquisition and conversion of nonprofit
hospitals, ensuring that hospital assets are deployed sufficiently for charitable health care purposes. See,
e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-7.11.b (Westlaw through L.2021, c. 32 and J.R. No. 1).
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the population; identification problems concerning which causal factors were
root causes; the numerous community members involved; potentially long
exposure and latency periods; and the many intervening casual factors that
might be considered superseding causes, such as contacts with other individuals
and health-harming actions by the potential plaintiffs. 237
Analogous causation hurdles can be seen in related debates on whether
persons who contract infectious disease can recover from members in the
community who choose to go unvaccinated. Commentators note that significant
factual and proximate causation problems may frustrate vindication of such
claims. Plaintiffs may not be able to satisfy traditional civil standards of proof
when identifying which unvaccinated person in the community actually
infected them because other unvaccinated persons and additional sources of
causation remain highly plausible in many situations of community
transmission. 238 Health authorities might have good evidence concerning the
suspect “index case” who likely served as the triggering event for initial
community transmission and a local outbreak. 239 But even then, difficult
questions arise whether the index patient can be considered the proximate cause
of secondary and tertiary infections because of intervening steps, actions of
other infected parties, and geographic and temporal remoteness. 240
2. Common Law Reluctance To Impose Affirmative Duties
At least as a matter of common law, more robust recognition of physicians’
public health duties seemingly represents a radical shift in doctrine. In relation
to non-patients, physicians are arguably in the same position as ordinary
individuals and, as such, they generally have no duty unless they are risk
creating or misfeasant. 241 This distinction between risk emanating from the
physician’s own treatment plan (more likely leading to duty because of
misfeasance) 242 versus risk already occurring with the patient (harder duty

237. See, e.g., Stubbs v. City of Rochester, 124 N.E. 137, 138 (N.Y. 1919) (concerning a claim
against the city for contaminated drinking water where independent factors presented multiple theories
of causation).
238. See Arthur L. Caplan, David Hoke, Nicholas J. Diamond & Viktoriya Karshenboyem, Free
To Choose but Liable for the Consequences: Should Non-Vaccinators Be Penalized for the Harm They Do?, 40
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 606, 607 (2012).
239. Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Compensating the Victims of Failure To Vaccinate: What Are the Options?,
23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 595, 622–23 (2014).
240. Id.
241. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1965) (“The origin
of the rule [of no duty to rescue] lay in the early common law distinction between action and inaction,
or ‘misfeasance’ and ‘non-feasance.’”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 37 (AM. L. INST. 2012); see also supra note 27 and accompanying text.
242. See, e.g., Davis v. S. Nassau Cmtys. Hosp., 46 N.E.3d 614, 617 (N.Y. 2015). In Davis v. South
Nassau Communities Hospital, 46 N.E. 614 (N.Y. 2015), the plaintiff was injured when a patient allegedly
became unconscious while driving and struck the plaintiff as a result of medications prescribed by the

99 N.C. L. REV. 923 (2021)

2021]

PHYSICIANS' ELUSIVE PUBLIC HEALTH DUTIES

969

question because of nonfeasance) becomes significant when thinking about the
full scope of physicians’ public health duties. In many public health contexts,
such as disease reporting or gun violence, the physician might be seen as
nonfeasant in failing to prevent harm already emanating from the patient, rather
than generating additional risk as part of the treatment provided.
Doctrinally, therefore, broad public health duties for physicians seemingly
run counter to the common-law tradition. This is a tradition that emphasizes
autonomy and allowing persons to choose to be instruments of good, rather than
having them answer to compelled societal obligations. This also reflects the
law’s preference for limited governmental intrusion into private affairs and a
negative state. 243 Public health’s more communitarian orientation, in contrast,
considers the populace’s baseline health as a necessary predicate to individual
exercise of autonomy. The public health perspective emphasizes the
interconnectedness of community members and each individual’s obligation to
account for the health needs of the population.
Common-law duty has been imposed in particular instances of
nonfeasance, such as Tarasoff situations when a doctor has a special relationship
with a patient whose mental health condition poses a specific risk of violence to
others. 244 But courts have recognized such affirmative duties on an incremental
basis and as exceptions to the ordinary no-duty rule. This is because “the
longstanding general duty/no-duty framework is an engrained one, solicitations
for new affirmative duties represent exceptions which require concrete and
substantial justification.” 245 Moreover, there is judicial sensitivity to
institutional competence. Legislatures and regulatory bodies may be better
equipped than courts to consider the social and policy consequences of
broadening duty rules and the full range of interests at stake beyond those of
the immediate litigants. 246
These considerations have significant merit and reveal the formidable
doctrinal challenges in enlarging the scope of physicians’ common-law public
health duties. But they do not completely preclude such a shift. First, significant
harms may be avoided if courts recognize stronger public health duties by
physicians. With public health duties underpowered at present, insidious
externalization of health risks from patients to the community occurs
unabated. 247 Extensive fact finding and prudent inquiry will hopefully account

physician. Id. at 616. The court held that the physician had an actionable duty to third parties to warn
the patient that the medications might affect the patient’s safe operation of a vehicle. Id. at 617.
243. See Phillip W. Romohr, A Right/Duty Perspective on the Legal and Philosophical Foundations of
the No-Duty-to-Rescue Rule, 55 DUKE L.J. 1025, 1043–44 (2006).
244. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345 (Cal. 1976); see also supra Section I.B.1.
245. Seebold v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 57 A.3d 1232, 1246 (Pa. 2012).
246. Id.
247. See supra Part III.
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for these largely unexamined costs associated with the patient-primacy directive
inevitably overriding public health concerns.
Second, as a doctrinal matter, the distinction between misfeasance and
nonfeasance is often misleading. Conduct characterized as one can readily be
reinterpreted as the other. 248 In addition, courts have expanded the special
relationship exceptions to the nonfeasance, no-duty rule in ways that make it
unclear why certain relationships—such as employer-employee and businesspublic invitee—fit into the exception but not others. 249 Therefore, it may be
better that the duty question not turn rigidly on characterizing a particular
physician’s conduct as misfeasance or nonfeasance, or whether the physician had
a “special relationship.” Instead, the duty question should more openly consider
the underlying policy considerations for imposing legal responsibility. In many
public health situations, as explained further below, physicians are in the best
position to address the community health risk, equivalent to the cheapest-cost
avoider. 250 Common-law courts have relied on such instrumental rationales as
which party can best control risk for imposing duty in other contexts. 251 With
physicians in particular, there are strong policy reasons to treat them, even
outside the doctor-patient relationship, as different from ordinary individuals.
Their actions and inactions with regard to public health risks have more
significant, wide-ranging consequences for the community because of their role
indispensability to safeguarding the health of the populace. 252 Although not an
entirely satisfactory answer to the doctrinal concerns of expanding physicians’
common-law public health duties, courts might ultimately justify such a move
as a form of “‘benign commandeering’ . . . [where] we impose special altruistic
responsibilities on [particular defendant classes such as] health care
professionals and places of public accommodation” for overall general
welfare. 253

248. See, e.g., John. M. Adler, Relying upon the Reasonableness of Strangers: Some Observations About
the Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties To Aid or Protect Others, 1991 WISC. L. REV. 867,
878.
249. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 40 cmt.
h (AM. L. INST. 2012) (“The term ‘special relationship’ has no independent significance. It merely
signifies that courts recognize an affirmative duty arising out of the relationship where otherwise no
duty would exist . . . .”).
250. See infra Section IV.B.
251. See, e.g., Dalury v. S–K–I, Ltd., 670 A.2d. 795, 799 (Vt. 1995) (holding that premises liability
imposes duty on those who own or control the land because they have “the expertise and opportunity
to foresee and control hazards” arising from use of the premises).
252. See infra Section IV.B.1.
253. Kenneth S. Abraham & Leslie Kendrick, There’s No Such Thing as Affirmative Duty, 104 IOWA
L. REV. 1649, 1692 (2019).
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3. Fiduciary Duty Constraints
Recalibrating physicians’ public health duties also runs the risk of
eviscerating their fiduciary obligations to patients. As previously noted, to the
extent the doctor-patient relationship has fiduciary characteristics, physicians’
fiduciary responsibilities generally direct them to maximize patient welfare, not
to disadvantage patients in favor of the health of the community. 254 However,
fiduciary duty constraints are not necessarily so restrictive. Under more flexible
interpretations of fiduciary law, a pathway exists for accommodating more
vigorous physician engagement in public health.
Fiduciary duty law likely does not alter the actual standard of care
physicians owe their patients, it may just require more elevated disclosure
through the informed consent doctrine. 255 The standard of care is usually
determined by medical custom and what reasonable physicians in the relevant
peer community ordinarily do. Thus, to the extent physicians more frequently
account for the public’s health in their treatment interactions with patients, and
inform patients of their public health reasons, the physician-fiduciary’s duty of
care is more easily satisfied. This would be the case even when a physician acts
as a gatekeeper to a critical resource or takes on other public health
responsibilities that do not singularly advance patient welfare.
Of course, the most troubling potential legal barrier is not the fiduciary
duty of care but the fiduciary duty of loyalty. How to square physicians favoring
community health with loyalty to the patient? Despite the strong rhetoric
surrounding the fiduciary’s duty of loyalty, absolute fidelity to the beneficiary
is not always required as courts occasionally modify the trust-based rules when
the maximalist position is at odds with policy and societal concerns. 256
Fiduciary law in the health care context has likewise been applied flexibly
to allow for financial incentives directed at physicians that otherwise might
present duty of loyalty concerns because the incentives help advance other
societal imperatives, such as controlling ever-escalating health care costs. 257
Further, courts have been reluctant to recognize broad causes of action against
physicians for breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty due to conflicting financial
interests. 258 If fiduciary law can tolerate use of potentially conflicting financial
254. See supra notes 17–27 and accompanying text.
255. Mark A. Hall, Rationing Health Care at the Bedside, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 762 (1994).
256. See John H. Langbien, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest?,
114 YALE L.J. 929, 977–78 (2005); D. Gordon Smith & Jordan C. Lee, Fiduciary Discretion, 75 OHIO
ST. L.J. 609, 621 (2014).
257. See, e.g., Robert Gatter, Communicating Loyalty: Advocacy and Disclosure of Conflicts in Treatment
and Research Relationships, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW 242–47 (I. Glenn Cohen,
Allison K. Hoffman & William M. Sage eds., 2017); Sam F. Halabi, Against Fiduciary Utopianism: The
Regulation of Physician Conflicts of Interest and Standards of Care, 11 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 433, 446–47
(2020).
258. Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496, 500 (Ill. 2000).
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incentives to engage physicians in important social objectives like controlling
health care costs, it would likewise seem able to accommodate physician
engagement in essential activities like public health protection.
Further, the question of the physician’s fiduciary duty of loyalty becomes
more complex when one recognizes that the typical physician has multiple
patients. Some actions taken by a physician to protect community health, such
as limiting antibiotic prescriptions, may disfavor the one patient denied access
while helping the physician’s other patients as members of the community who
benefit from reduced risk of antibiotic resistance. By analogy, fiduciary doctrine
in other contexts such as trust law recognizes that because the trustee has a duty
to multiple beneficiaries, there is latitude for deploying trust assets in unequal
shares to account for differing needs and priorities among the group as a
whole. 259 As such, the physician embracing more robust public health actions
that may favor certain patients over others can often credibly argue that she is
trying to discharge loyalty obligations to multiple patients.
Moreover, a physician can also credibly argue that in discharging her duty
of loyalty to a patient, she should have flexibility to account for both the
patient’s current and future health needs. Actions that disfavor a current patient
may in some instances actually advantage the same patient in the future.
Returning to antibiotic conservation, for example, physician gatekeeping that
limits antibiotic use of only marginal benefit to a patient helps preserve the
medication’s effectiveness generally. Thus, if the same patient has more
compelling need for the same drug in a future health care episode, the antibiotic
is then more likely to offer benefit.
B.

Possible Justifications for Stronger Public Health Duties

Notwithstanding the inherent challenges in strengthening physicians’
public health duties, countervailing justifications support such a move. These
considerations include physicians’ role indispensability, the expertise they can
apply in discharging such duties, social contract theory, validating social
expectations, and ensuring equitable distribution of physician burden in
combatting public health threats.
1. Role Indispensability
Perhaps the strongest justification for law to impose enhanced public
health duties on physicians is role indispensability. The argument is not that
physicians are particularly suited for the role of public health stewards. But,
pragmatically, they are still likely better than the alternatives. Simply put, the
public health system cannot effectively operate without broad, engaged
259. Theodore W. Ruger, Can a Patient-Centered Ethos Be Other-Regarding? Ought It Be?, 45 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1513, 1522 (2010).
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participation of private physicians. The traditional medicine/public health
divide typically overlooks private physicians as part of the public health space.
However, as the COVID-19 pandemic has revealed, traditional public health
personnel such as contact tracers and epidemiologists are quite limited in
number and work for state and local health departments that have been
consistently underfunded and understaffed. 260 To a surprising degree, “[t]he
rest of the [public health] response is in the hands of thousands of private
militias — hospitals, insurers, doctors, nurses, respiratory technicians,
pharmacists and so on . . . .” 261
Physicians work at the critical nerve center of this private/public response
force. Their uniquely advantageous position—strategically embedded between
their patient, other patients, and society—makes private physicians’
engagement critical for effective public health protection. First, physicians
perform a sentinel function. As frontline practitioners, they are often patients’
first contact with the delivery system. They have the initial opportunity to
interact with individuals and identify illnesses and concerning patterns, such as
antibiotic-resistant infections, opioid abuse, or novel viral cases, that suggest
larger threats to community health. Community physicians become “privy to
social trends long before those trends become epidemics in our communities[,
and w]hen they observe patient after patient with the same diagnosis, they’re
the first to see the patterns.” 262 Private physicians have been recognized as
“critical partners in monitoring community health” because, in their patient
interactions in the clinical trenches, they regularly “encounter diseases,
conditions, and injuries that may be important not only for an individual patient
but also for the community as a whole.” 263
Physicians may not only be the first to observe and identify warning signs
of community health threats, but they also are usually in the best position to act
on the information when limited time windows exist. For example, as
mandatory reporters of infectious disease cases to public health authorities,
community physicians are arguably more important responders than clinical
laboratories and other secondary providers who also have statutory reporting
260. See generally TR. FOR AM.’S HEALTH, THE IMPACT OF CHRONIC UNDERFUNDING ON
AMERICA’S PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEM: TRENDS, RISKS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 2019 (2019),
https://www.tfah.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/TFAH_2019_PublicHealthFunding_07.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YB6K-JHK7] (examining federal, state, and local public health funding trends and
recommended investment and policy actions to prioritize prevention to address twenty-first century
health threats).
261. Donald G. McNeil Jr., American Public Health Infrastructure Needs an Update, N.Y. TIMES
(June 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirus-facts-history.html [https://perma.cc/
NY3Z-MNKQ (dark archive)].
262. Elizabeth Métraux, Health Care Providers: Canaries in the Coal Mines of American Society? STAT
(Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/09/19/social-change-health-care-providers-canariescoal-mines-american-society/ [https://perma.cc/B3Q6-6B6G].
263. Gakh et al., supra note 173, at 336.
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obligations. Physicians can make quick professional judgments based on clinical
examination of patients, whereas other providers may need more testing time
and “a reporting delay . . . to providers waiting for laboratory-confirmation
could have a substantial public health impact by permitting further spread of a
highly communicable disease.” 264
Second, community physicians perform the key role as gatekeeper. As
agents of their patients with superior knowledge and discretionary authority to
order care and make referrals, community physicians are in a position to
monitor, influence, and even induce demand for health care products and
services. Health policy analysts advise that there is no more powerful lever in
the health care market than the “physician’s pen” because physicians’
discretionary orders 265 and prescriptions account for seventy to ninety percent
of all health care costs. 266
Gatekeeping has most often been associated with cost control. The ideal
gatekeeper physician balances particular patient needs and potential benefits of
interventions with the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of care, sometimes
limiting care plans in order to conserve resources for other patients. 267 But there
is a clear connection between gatekeeping and public health. For example, in
the case of antibiotic resistance, physician gatekeeping is critical. By limiting
antibiotic orders for only high-value uses and engaging in other conservation
strategies, physicians can minimize community health threats, such as resistant
bacteria and ineffective medications. 268 Likewise, the negative downstream
effects for the populace of indiscriminate opioid prescribing can be understood
as physicians performing poorly as gatekeepers to powerfully addictive
medications. 269 In short, physicians’ gatekeeping function makes them uniquely
positioned to direct the use of limited societal resources for safeguarding the
health of the community.
Third, physicians perform key roles as learned intermediaries, distilling
and shaping complex medical information for their patients’ particular
situations and needs. Informed consent law envisions a counseling role for the
physician in educating the patient about a proposed treatment’s material risks

264. Fill et al., supra note 179, at 585.
265. William M. Sage, Fracking Health Care: How To Safely De-Medicalize America and Recover
Trapped Value for Its People, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 635, 642 & n.22 (2017).
266. Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost
Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 434 (1988).
267. See generally Hall, supra note 255 (arguing for lifting the ethical taboo against physician bedside
rationing); Jessica Mantel, A Defense of Physicians’ Gatekeeping Role: Balancing Patients’ Needs with Society’s
Interests, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 633 (2015) (arguing that physicians have a duty of care both to individual
patients and society at large, and that health care rationing is called for to balance these two duties).
268. See supra Section III.B.
269. See supra Section III.D.
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and benefits and the medically viable alternatives. 270 Physicians frequently have
to explain not only the risks and benefits of proposed treatments, but also more
basic diagnostic details about what is medically occurring with the patient and
how the patient’s body may be responding. In this respect, a fair share of health
care might be considered “credence” goods and services, rather than more
common “experience” or “search” goods and services in the marketplace. 271
Rather than form impressions largely based on her own experiences with
treatment, a patient depends on the physician, as learned intermediary, to
explain what has been working or not. Further, the learned intermediary
doctrine under products liability law recognizes that pharmaceutical suppliers
can discharge their duty to warn about medication risks by alerting prescribing
physicians through drug label inserts, “Dear Doctor” letters, and otherwise,
rather than directly warning the end-user patients. 272 Physicians are legally
expected to, in turn, discuss some, but not all, of this information with their
patients. Physicians mediate the risk information exchange, using their expert
medical knowledge and understanding of the patient’s situation to provide
information about the drug and its risks that is tailored to the patient’s
condition. 273
As learned intermediaries, physicians can also engage in significant public
health protection. They can call attention to public health implications that
their patients may not otherwise understand or heed. For example, a physician
who does not consider public health obligations could simply inform a patient
that prescribing an antibiotic for a viral infection will be ineffective and offer
the patient no curative effects. But if the physician were attentive to her public
health role, she could lean into her learned intermediary status and further
counsel that prescribing in these situations endangers community health
because of increasing selection pressures for resistant bacteria in the
community.
Physicians are successful learned intermediaries not only because they
have expertise but because they command significant public trust. 274 As such,
they can be very effective public health counselors when interacting with their
patients and members of the community. Of course, trust in health care is
somewhat fragile and can be easily squandered. 275 It is possible that a legal shift
270. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786–88 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
271. Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 929 (1994).
272. See, e.g., Centocor, Inc. v. Hamilton, 372 S.W.3d. 140, 154–59 (Tex. 2012).
273. Id.
274. See Megan Brenan, Nurses Keep Health Lead as Most Honest, Ethical Profession, GALLUP (Dec.
26, 2017), http://news.gallup.com/poll/224639/nurses-keep-healthy-lead-honest-ethical-profession
.aspx?g_source=CATEGORY_SOCIAL_POLICY_ISSUES&g_medium=topic&g_campaign=tiles
[https://perma.cc/J24V-LFPT] (presenting polling information indicating that physicians are among
the most highly trusted professions).
275. See Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 508–09 (2002).
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requiring stronger physician duties for public health protection could erode
patient trust if patients perceive their physicians are no longer as devoted to
individual patient welfare. However, powerful intrinsic reasons for patients to
have confidence in their physicians exist, even in the face of legal regulation
that seemingly threatens trust in the doctor-patient relationship. 276
2. Expertise
Related to their role indispensability, physicians have a particular
expertise to apply in addressing public health threats. Difficulty of discharging
a legal duty and extent of the burden it imposes on a potential class of
defendants are usually critical policy considerations in determining whether to
impose affirmative legal duties. 277 Community physicians’ relevant expertise
makes it more likely that they can feasibly discharge stronger public health
responsibilities.
To start, physicians have a comprehensive understanding of medical
processes to evaluate how public health risks interact with biologic systems and
human physiology. 278 In wide-ranging public health matters such as smoking,
using motorcycle helmets, and wearing masks, physicians can also directly relate
the health experiences of their own patients to the health threats of the
community. 279 In addition, physicians have special capabilities because of their
training in differential diagnosis and iterative, flexible diagnostic processes. For
example, physicians’ clinical judgment and diagnostic skills are needed for
public health surveillance to identify certain threatening diseases and
syndromes, like fungal meningitis and pediatric influenza, that do not have
confirmatory laboratory tests available. 280 Even for diseases and syndromes that
can be confirmed through lab tests, physicians may have access to other
important information by handling specimens and identifying unusual
symptom indications and other relevant clinical evidence. Skilled interviews
with patients and expert diagnostic skills enable physicians to recognize
“clusters of illness as well as urgent, suspected diseases.” 281
Admittedly, there are increasingly expansive demands on physicians to
address all sorts of societal problems, especially with the new interest in social

276. Id. at 507.
277. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976).
278. Robert S. Lawrence, The Role of Physicians in Promoting Health, 9 HEALTH AFFS. 122, 124
(1990).
279. Russell L. Gruen, Steven D. Pearson & Troyen A. Brennan, Physician-Citizens—Public Roles
and Professional Obligations, 291 JAMA 94, 96 (2004).
280. Fill et al., supra note 179, at 581.
281. Gakh et al., supra note 173, at 329 (quoting Colleen M. McClean, Benjamin J. Silk, James W.
Buehler & Ruth L. Berkelman, Disease Reporting Among Georgia Physicians and Laboratories, 16 J. PUB.
HEALTH MGMT. & PRAC. 535, 535 (2010)).
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determinants of health. 282 Thus, some advocates urge physicians to write
prescriptions for food and housing, 283 to promote affordable health care, 284 to
fight climate change, 285 and otherwise to tackle larger socioeconomic issues
affecting the health of their patients and the population. At some point, one
must question whether physicians really have sufficient expertise to address so
many wide-ranging social problems, many of which seem several levels removed
from ordinary decision-making in the clinic.
However, with many of the public health risks contemplated in this
Article, a clearer connection exists between the community harms at issue and
physician expertise. Risks such as antibiotic-resistant infections, as well as
indications of dementia or suicidal ideation among gun owners, are
fundamentally clinical health risks in origin. These are hazards where
community physicians’ specialized skills and abilities in clinical diagnosis and
health communication more likely matter and have real impact. As such, their
highly relevant expertise cuts in favor of amplifying physicians’ public health
duties.
3. Social Contract
Social contract theory envisions citizens consenting to give power to the
state as part of an assumed, theorized bargain. 286 Citizens will receive certain
benefits from the state, such as protection of their liberty and property. In
return, citizens owe society something back and, some commentators contend,
this can extend to helping others avoid harm, especially if the state cannot do
so alone. 287 As the state cannot safeguard community health alone, and because
private physicians are indispensable to an effective public health system, social
contract theory supports stronger affirmative obligations on physicians to
protect public health.

282. See, e.g., Paula Braverman & Laura Gottlieb, The Social Determinants of Health: It’s Time To
Consider the Causes of the Causes, 129 PUB. HEALTH REPS. 19, 19 (2014); Jessica Mantel, Tackling the
Social Determinants of Health: A Central Role for Providers, 33 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 217, 217 (2017).
283. Alice Park, Why Food Could Be the Best Medicine of All, TIME (Feb. 21, 2019, 6:10 AM),
https://time.com/longform/food-best-medicine/ [https://perma.cc/ESG2-SJCZ]; Aaron Shroyer,
Writing a Prescription for Housing, URB. INST. (July 5, 2017), https://housingmatters.urban.org/
articles/writing-prescription-housing [https://perma.cc/37VJ-7WG5].
284. Gruen et al., supra note 279, at 96.
285. Leonid Eidelman, Why Doctors Need To Join the Fight Against Climate Change, FORTUNE (Dec.
8, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://fortune.com/2018/12/08/climate-change-doctors-physicians/ [https://
perma.cc/YHQ2-S5V4].
286. See, e.g., Ani B. Satz, Overcoming Fragmentation in Disability in Health Law, 60 EMORY L.J.
277, 305–08 (2010).
287. See Steven J. Heyman, Foundations of the Duty To Rescue, 47 VAND. L. REV. 673, 706 (1994)
(“Although the state generally fulfills this duty [of protection] through its own officers, on some
occasions an officer will not be present or will require assistance. In such situations, the state reasonably
may impose an obligation on every citizen present to assist in preserving the life of a fellow citizen.”).
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Further, social contract perspectives view physicians as more than just
ordinary citizens in terms of what they may owe back to the state as part of an
assumed, theorized bargain. In addition to the basic benefits every citizen
enjoys from the state, physicians receive additional advantages and privileges.
They are granted a special license to provide professional services. They also
receive expensive medical education and graduate medical training that the
government significantly subsidizes. 288 In addition, physicians enjoy high social
status and the perks of membership in an elite, guild-like profession that
commands much deference from society, including in setting standards of care,
disciplining professional members, and determining which services even require
medical licensure. 289 In return for these particular benefits, physicians arguably
have obligations to “provide care when needed by the public.” 290
However, it is debatable whether social contract theory can be relied upon
to require broader public health measures of physicians that are outside ordinary
doctor-patient relationships. For example, some commentators question
whether social contract obligations justify expectations that physicians work, at
much personal risk to themselves, during a pandemic. 291 To the extent social
contract theory arguments heavily depend on some quid pro quo for the societal
benefits physicians enjoy, the difficult question is whether physicians
understand what their end of the bargain is and thus voluntarily assume broad
public health responsibilities when entering the medical profession. 292
Physicians could credibly argue they did not believe they had robust public
health duties when deciding to practice medicine. Indeed, expansive public
health obligations are not expressly enumerated in physician licensure laws. 293
Moreover, medical ethics and norms so emphasize the patient-primacy
directive that physicians could justify regular patient care activities as fulfilling
their end of any implicit social contract bargain, without needing to provide
more open-ended public health protection to the community at large. Indeed,
the way physicians pay back the state for their societal benefits can take many
forms, including sharing knowledge gained from medical research, volunteering
for some uncompensated care, training the next generation of physicians, and

288. See ELAYNE J. HEISLER, BRYCE H.P. MENDEZ, ALISON MITCHELL, SIDATH
VIRANGA PANANGALA & MARCO A. VILLAGRANA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44376, FEDERAL
SUPPORT FOR GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION: AN OVERVIEW 3–5 (2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44376.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8YJ-ML3Q]; Catherine Rampell, How
Medicare Subsidizes Doctor Training, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX (Dec. 17, 2013, 10:00 AM),
https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/12/17/how-medicare-subsidizes-doctor-training/ [https://
perma.cc/QL2H-8NJ2 (dark archive)].
289. Gruen et al., supra note 279, at 95.
290. Orentlicher, supra note 4, at 1461.
291. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 83, at 30–32.
292. Id. at 30.
293. See supra Section I.C.
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participating in prudent administration of the health care delivery system. Also,
to the extent subsidized medical education is the primary societal benefit many
physicians enjoy, this is an economic benefit, and arguably physicians’ quid pro
quo obligation in return could also be limited to items of economic value, not
necessarily working to safeguard the public’s health. 294 Accordingly, if
physicians really owe something to society, it is not clear that the payback
encompasses assuming public health duties to any degree.
4. Social Expectations
As legal duties often mirror and reinforce social attitudes, an important
consideration is whether imposing more vigorous public health duties on
physicians vindicates or frustrates societal expectations about the medical
profession. The patient-primacy directive is so well ingrained that individuals
find considerable comfort from the idea that their physicians put patients first.
Indeed, both the public and most physicians likely agree on the dynamic of “the
good doctor who cares for the one patient at any one time, and the patient who
expects that the best will be done for him or her.” 295 Under this view, physicians
who “prioriti[ze] public health care . . . would devalue the expectation of
patients.” 296
On the other hand, is patient primacy really all that the public envisions
for physicians? Social expectations might actually be more nuanced. The public
does regularly observe community physicians working to safeguard public
health, with common activities such as vaccination and assessing impaired
patients’ fitness to drive. And throughout history, the public has observed selfsacrificing behavior by physicians during public health crisis periods in
combatting spread of infectious disease. 297 Under this view, “[h]istorically,
medicine as a learned profession has been understood to have a social
responsibility to use knowledge and skills to enhance the common good,
including obligations to protect public health and safety.” 298
Thus, honoring social expectations in shaping physicians’ public health
duties becomes tricky. The public likely holds somewhat contradictory, even
unrealistic views about physicians—that clinicians should always do what is best
for the patient and should vigorously safeguard the health of the community.
This should not surprise as the public regularly has fickle, inconsistent views

294. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 83, at 31.
295. Heinz-Harald Abholz, Conflicts Between Personal and Public Health Care: Can One GP Serve
Two Masters?, 57 BRIT. J. GEN. PRAC. 693, 693 (2007).
296. Id. at 694.
297. Orentlicher, supra note 4, at 1459–60.
298. COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUD. AFFS., AM. MED. ASS’N, CEJA REP. 1-A-12, PHYSICIAN
STEWARDSHIP OF HEALTH CARE RESOURCES 142 (2012) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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when it comes to health care, such as an expectation that the delivery system
should offer the best care possible but at low cost and unrestricted access.
Further, from the ex ante perspective, before knowing what their
particular circumstances will be, most individuals would likely prefer a regime
where physicians have more robust public health duties that sometimes trump
patient welfare concerns. Yes, an individual patient may suffer loss if his
physician at times prioritizes public health over doing the best possible for the
patient. At the same time, however, that same patient enjoys offsetting benefits
when other patients’ physicians pay greater heed to their public health roles. In
other words, if other patients’ physicians are empowered and expected to act more
readily to protect the health of the populace, the individual patient still benefits
from the enhanced health protections the community now enjoys.
Certainly, better explanation to the public about why private physicians at
times need to act as agents of community health would help adjust social
expectations going forward. Further, if physicians were also required to notify
patients in advance about their practice operations and the individual patient
welfare/public health balance as part of the informed consent process, this
would also help align social expectations with physicians’ enhanced public
health responsibilities. Adjustment to patient expectations by advance
disclosure already occurs in some public health contexts. For example, standard
HIPAA notifications from health care providers advise patients that otherwiseconfidential patient health information may be shared with public health
agencies. 299
5. Equitable Distribution of Physician Burden/Collective Action
Legal recognition of more robust public health duties for physicians also
would make application of such duties more visible and uniform, helping
address concerns of inequitable physician burden. Physicians who directly take
on public health challenges shoulder a very large responsibility if not supported
by their professional peers. For example, during pandemics, “it is much more
feasible for any one physician to assume the risks of providing care . . . when all
physicians are sharing the risks.” 300 Concerns about inequitable physician
burdens apply equally well to many other public health problems. Efforts to
address community health risks such as gun violence and opioid abuse become
more manageable when the onus is spread more evenly among doctors in the
clinical trenches. Imposing public health duties more uniformly also helps
advance physicians’ professional solidarity. As members of the same profession,
299. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b) (2019); DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., NOTICE OF
PRIVACY PRACTICES 6, https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/npp_booklet_hc
_provider.pdf [https://perma.cc/C48G-3U2V] (“We are allowed or required to share your information
in other ways – usually in ways that contribute to the public good, such as public health . . . .”).
300. Orentlicher, supra note 4, at 1460.
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physicians arguably have some obligation to assist fellow physicians who endure
significant hardship in addressing public health threats. 301
Further, combating many public health threats necessarily raises collective
action challenges. The efforts of only some community physicians, however
vigorous, will not have much effect if other physicians are not on board because
of the interconnectedness of the health care system’s components and the
manner in which public health risks propagate. For example, in the case of
antibiotic resistance, a few physicians’ inappropriate prescribing patterns can
introduce strong resistance selection pressures in the community that may
render future uses of medications ineffective, even if other physicians prudently
conserve antibiotics. 302 Similarly, indiscriminate prescribing of opioids by a few
physicians can have devastating effects for a local community, even if other
physicians are more mindful of the dangers of opioid access. Addicted patients
will doctor shop and gravitate towards the few physicians prescribing widely.
And patients still able to abuse opioids will generate exponentially greater
health risks for the community through needle sharing and other healthharming activity.
Given such enormous collective action challenges, “the survival of the
community” demands that physician responsibility for public health matters be
shared broadly. 303 Moreover, letting some physicians “off the hook” by not
recognizing and uniformly applying more robust public health duties invites
further collective action problems of free riders and insufficient coordination.
This encourages the view among private physicians that they should “stay in
their lane,” that all will be fine if they simply take care of their individual
patients, and that other doctors and public health workers will take care of
particular public health risks. The problem is that the more disregard of public
health matters becomes tolerated, the more physicians are likely to neglect their
public health duties. 304
C.

Possible Ways Forward

The exact formulation of recalibrated public health duties for physicians
is beyond the intended scope of this Article. Its principal aim has been to call
attention to the harmful risk externalization occurring when law’s patientprimacy directive overrides physicians’ elusive public health duties. It also has
sought to provide deeper theoretical foundations for making physicians’ public
health duties more cognizable and influential. Nonetheless, this final section
301. Gruen et al., supra note 279, at 97.
302. See INST. OF MED., supra note 168, at 37; Livermore, supra note 168, at S15–S16.
303. Ahronheim, supra note 92, at 233.
304. See Orentlicher, supra note 4, at 1460 (noting that exceptions to a physician duty to treat
during pandemics “can trigger a self-reinforcing cycle of physician withdrawal that ultimately would
defeat the duty”).

99 N.C. L. REV. 923 (2021)

982

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99-4

concludes by offering some preliminary considerations for moving forward with
a legal shift in physicians’ obligations.
First, adjusted expectations are in order regarding how to balance patient
and public health duties. It is acknowledged that enhancing physicians’ public
health duties, while still demanding strong obligations to each patient, may lead
to much variability in practice. Physicians could point to either patient or public
health as justification for different conduct. However, any adjustment in
physicians’ legal duties, if it brings more accountability and visibility to public
health considerations flowing from physician decision-making, would still
represent an improvement over the status quo where public health seems to be
consistently given short shrift in favor of patient primacy. Further, many legal
duties are not capable of being stated with rule-like precision as the duty
analysis often ends up balancing a number of shifting factors and policy
considerations. “[D]uty is not sacrosanct in itself . . . but is only an expression
of the sum total of those considerations of policy [which] lead the law to say
that the plaintiff is entitled to protection.” 305 Thus, it should be expected that
even with a move towards more robust public health duties for physicians, there
will still be variability in similar situations of patient-public health tension in
how forcefully the public health obligations are applied.
Second, lawmakers and regulators ideally should, through statutes and
regulations, identify clearer pathways where private physicians can enter the
public health sphere, move beyond their heavy relational orbit with patients,
and protect non-patients from health risks. For example, as previously noted,
some medical practice acts permit physicians to prescribe opioid antagonists,
such as naloxone, to non-patients to prevent overdoses. 306 What is needed are
more statutory provisions of this type, which clearly embrace a public health
role for private physicians in taking action for the community, including
expectations that are binding and not just permissive. Such codification would
be welcome to counter perceived barriers because of patient primacy. It also
might have larger impact because of the expressive effect of law in changing
norms. 307 Clearer legal recognition of physicians’ connections to non-patients
would help shift professional norms about physician engagement in matters of
public health.
Third, also critical is stronger enforcement of the minimal public health
obligations for physicians already existing under law, such as addressing
physicians’ poor compliance with statutory obligations to report communicable-

305. Doe v. Cochran, 210 A.3d 469, 478 (Conn. 2019) (second alteration in original) (quoting
Jarmie v. Troncale, 50 A.3d 802, 809–10 (Conn. 2012)); see also DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN &
ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 255 (2d ed. 2020).
306. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
307. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022–23 (1996).
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disease cases. 308 Importantly, stronger enforcement does not necessarily mean
severe licensure discipline or increased civil fines. More consistent enforcement
of the modest sanctions already existing under these laws might prove just as
effective, especially if other physicians take note of the uptick in actions against
noncompliant physicians as cautionary tales. Further, higher compliance can
also be achieved through targeted education, auditing, positive rewards, and
leveraging physicians’ intrinsic reasons for compliance, not just threat of heavy
sanction. In this respect, lawmakers might consider adding additional financial
incentives under governmental health care programs such as Medicare and
Medicaid for physicians meeting targeted public health goals. This could
include, for example, bonuses for prescribing antibiotics within recommended
resistance-control guidelines or engaging in a threshold number of gun-violence
screenings with patients. It may also be, as previously discussed, that because
of unbounded liability concerns some public health duties are better enforced
by prudent intermediaries such as medical boards instead of through private
actions. 309 However, medical boards will need to really step up their
enforcement activity. Physician oversight from licensing authorities has been
traditionally lax in public health matters, but “this largely under-resourced
system” 310 may ultimately have greater beneficial effect if deployed more
vigorously.
Finally, nonmaleficence serves as a helpful guiding principle for thinking
about the dual-loyalty problem between patient welfare and public health.
Nonmaleficence, often known as the “duty to do no harm,” is one of the four
commonly recognized core principles of bioethics along with beneficence,
autonomy, and justice. 311 Nonmaleficence generally requires that a physician’s
intervention not harm the patient. 312 While autonomy has often overshadowed
the other core bioethics principles in recent discourse, 313 nonmaleficence still
offers valuable instruction in this context. In many instances of potential dualloyalty conflict, physicians could better justify actions taken for public health
protection by ensuring such conduct, even if not maximizing patient welfare, at
least does not further harm their individual patients or such harm is minimized
as much as possible. This may not be practicable in all patient/public health
308.
309.
310.
311.

See supra Section III.C.
See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
Barnes et al., supra note 206, at 23.
See generally TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS (7th ed. 2012) (developing an approach to medical ethics based on four prima facie moral
principles and attention to these principles' scope of application).
312. See, e.g., Thomas R. McCormick, Principles of Bioethics, UNIV. WASH. MED., https://depts.
washington.edu/bhdept/ethics-medicine/bioethics-topics/articles/principles-bioethics [https://perma
.cc/R6G6-7U9F].
313. Lois Shepherd, Sophie’s Choices: Medical and Legal Responses to Suffering, 72 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 103, 117–18 (1996).
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conflicts. When respecting nonmaleficence is feasible with concurrent public
health protection, however, physicians’ public health duties should be
interpreted to incorporate the principle. Physicians should be deemed to
faithfully discharge their reinvigorated public health duties only if, in doing so,
they also have managed harm avoidance/harm minimization with their
individual patients.
CONCLUSION
Law generally obscures physicians’ public health duties with limited, ad
hoc recognition and insufficient theorization for the source and strength of
these duties. The strong patient-primacy directive often overrides physicians’
elusive public health obligations in ways that facilitate externalization of health
risks from patients to the community. This problematic pattern, more salient as
a result of COVID-19, threatens an already fragile public health system.
Legal change alone will not be sufficient to ensure optimal physician
engagement in public health protection. A variety of reforms, such as more
education, training, and positive rewards, including, importantly, stronger
financial incentives for physicians’ public health actions, are also needed.
However, clearer legal recognition of physicians’ public health duties can also
have extra-legal impact to the extent it helps shift professional norms about
physician engagement in matters of public health.
While amplification seems warranted, where law gives greater visibility to
and puts more weight on physicians’ obligations to safeguard community health,
such a legal shift raises difficult challenges, both practical and doctrinal, such as
potential unbounded liability exposure and overcoming law’s general reluctance
to impose affirmative duties outside special relationships. Various justifications
support this shift, including social contract theory and equitable distribution of
physician burden, although they may not fully address all concerns with
recalibrating physicians’ duties.
At bottom, the most compelling reason to amplify physicians’ public
health duties is instrumental. Law needs to appropriate physicians for public
health protection because, as a practical matter, there are no better choices. The
nation’s public health system largely depends upon nongovernmental actors,
and private physicians are at the center of this public/private response.
Physicians occupy a unique strategic role embedded between the patient, other
patients, and society and perform critical sentinel, gatekeeper, and learned
intermediary functions that are indispensable to effective public health
protection. Requiring physicians to pay greater heed to the population’s health,
even to the occasional detriment of doing all possible for individual patients,
has become an unavoidable imperative.

